## **THE LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE A1**

are apparently some who think the submarine's chances of attaining efficiency over-rated, and its necessary limitations unduly minimised. It is certainly a rather difficult and in some ways a clumsy weapon to handle. But those who depreciate it forget the special task for which it is specially suited-namely, the deterring or destruction of an invading flotilla. The Russo-Japanese War, in which no submarines have been employed by either side, has nevertheless already afforded us a striking lesson on the difficulties of invasion by sea. Admiral Togo is at least as cool and dashing a commander as any Europe is likely to send against us; and has had a smaller margin of shipping and supplies. Yet his allowance of time and of tonnage for the transport of the armies entrusted to him has been large: so large that one of our best naval experts has calculated the flotilla necessary for invading England with a complete army of 100,000 men at something like 450 vessels, of 800,000 tons, and the time required for landing them with all their equipment, if undisturbed in the operation, at about fifty days. Moreover, and this is the most remarkable point, the Japanese Admiral appears in spite of every inducement to make up for the loss of time caused by the unexpectedly bad weather (a loss calculated at three weeks) to have felt it unsafe to move his transports without at the same moment blocking the exit from Port Arthur temporarily by bombardment or permanently by sinking vessels. His convoys never exceeded seventy-five vessels; his battleships, cruisers, and torpedo-boats, after their first success, held a complete superiority over those of the enemy; but the danger was not to be faced, for a fleet of transports crowded with troops is human impotence in its most vulnerable form.

Now if this was Admiral Togo's view in presence of a few warships confined to a single base and under the closest observation, what would be his feeling in transporting troops to a coast amply provided with submarines, working from a number of bases within moderate distance of one another? To be more "actual," what would be the advice of a European admiral

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