

Looking at it with the sense not excited, you see only certain plain shapes and colours; but looking at it with the subjective sense excited, you just see the same forms and colours, but bathed in all the harmony of excited sense. This harmony or subjective sense is nothing tangible or inherent in the object itself, but æsthetic and native to the mind.

All we can say here, in regard to these truths, is just that God has wisely constituted the human mind with these appreciative subjective senses, and has formed outward objects either so excellently or otherwise, as just to excite, or attract, or repel these appreciative feelings.

From this fact, then, it follows, that a man devoid, for example, of the appreciative sense of beauty, can never see beauty; though he may see all the outward forms and colours, which should arouse it where it exists. To such a person, beauty would only be a suitable word, learned from others, to portray the peculiarities of nature, as green, red, yellow, etc., do in a cold intellectual description.

By this power of the subjective senses to appreciate the order or arrangement of things outside of us, we come to apply the quality of the subjective sense itself to the outside object, and thus speak of objects as pleasant, beautiful, or ugly; all because the one thing excites the subjective sense of appreciative enjoyment, and the other the subjective derelish of ugliness.

That there is a peculiar excellence in the outside thing which excites the corresponding appreciative feeling, is at the same time not to be forgotten.

Every person, familiar with the operations of his own mind, must have marked the power which even the imagination (see definition) has of exciting subjective senses of this kind. The dreamy, and at the same time, fictitious conceptions of the poet as well as the novelist, excite many pleasing senses of this class. To know the fact, one has but to watch the play of his own imagination.

By this active play of the fancy, we can form conceptions of scenes of grandeur or sublimity, or of witty or ludicrous combinations, which, though they have no reality in nature, yet excite and please us. It is observable, however, that in order to excite this class of feelings in this way, the merely imaginative must at least be connected with the possibility of the conception being either real, or made real, in experience. The fictitious conception used as an excitant, must always be compounded with, or rest on a solid substratum of the known. The pictures of Shakespeare and Scott derive enormous power from their historical character; and the knowledge, that an imaginative conception is realizable in no stage of existence, generally at once kills its power of exciting the æsthetic feelings.

Subjective Feelings of this Class are Occasional in their Occurrence.

In a state of activity, some of them are attended with considerable emotion; as, for instance, music or harmony. They are not characterized by strong desire or aversion; the exciting objects being generally things rather than persons. Desire or aversion is usually strongest when the excitant is a person, as in subjective senses of the "heart." The feelings of taste are more strictly those of pain or pleasure, than of desire or aversion. Their impulse is neither strongly benevolent nor malevolent in its bearings on persons. They are usually pure in their moral quality, and in harmony with the subjective feelings of conscience.

Feelings of this class are not unseldom excited and appeased simultaneously; as, for instance, the melody of song may excite and gratify at the same moment. They appease usually as feelings of mere pain or pleasure; the pleasurable do so directly, in the continuance of the exciting object in exciting character or relations; and the disagreeable do so responsively, by its change into non-exciting character or relations.

Note here, that when we use the word "gratified," we mean that the impulse or feeling may be gratified, but not abated; but when we apply the word "appease," we mean that the impulse is both gratified and abated.

The Table (see Table A, pages 20 and 21) contains but a very few of the subjective feelings of taste, thus affording only a specimen, rather than an exhaustive comparison.

We find also that feelings of an entirely different class are sometimes associated, in activity, with the æsthetic.

If there is a general accuracy in the Table, we do not aim at perfectness.

Subjective Feelings of the "Heart."

The subjective feelings of the "Heart" concern themselves more with our social relations than the æsthetic, and are excited by persons rather than things. They are very strongly emotive, and are usually attended with strong desire or aversion. Most of them are either benevolent or malevolent in their bearing on other persons; and their impulses are usually