

an Archbishopric. Dr. Weldon's appointment is an excellent one in every way. He was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, where he had a most distinguished career. At Eton he carried off the Newcastle Scholarship, and at the university he carried everything before him. He gained a scholarship at his college, and afterwards became a Fellow of the same Foundation. Besides these honours, he carried off, between the years 1873 and 1877, the Carus Greek Testament prize, the Bell University Scholarship, Sir Wm. Browne's medals, and the Craven Scholarship, all of which are university prizes. In the latter year he took his B.A. degree, heading the list of the Classical Tripos. He was, in addition, the Senior Chancellor's Medallist. Three years later he proceeded to the degree of M.A., and in 1883 was ordained deacon in Canterbury Cathedral by the late Archbishop Benson, being advanced to the priesthood two years later at Rochester. For two years—1883 to 1885—Dr. Weldon was Head-master of Dulwich College, and in the latter year was appointed to the position which he now holds at Harrow-on-the-Hill. He is one of Her Majesty's chaplains-in-ordinary, and has been select preacher, both before his own university, as well as the sister university of Oxford on several occasions. Last year he filled the position of Hulsean lecturer at Cambridge. The Bishop-designate of Calcutta has published a number of books, and has frequently read papers at various Church Congresses. He was born in the year 1854, and is therefore but 44 years old. Lord Hamilton has done well in making so excellent an appointment to such an important bishopric.

#### DIVORCE.

In our previous article we endeavoured to point out the nature of the Law of Divorce as promulgated under the Mosaic economy and expounded by our Lord. Certain points were clear enough. Others were made probable. To the latter class belongs our adhesion to the ordinary interpretation of Porneia, in opposition to Doellinger. It may be well to add to this the remark of Watkins in his able and comprehensive treatise on Holy Matrimony. It will be remembered that Doellinger held that Porneia, in St. Matt. xix., 9., referred to prenuptial unchastity. But Mr. Watkins observes well: "In reply to the argument of the great German theologian, it may be urged, first, that the one ground of divorce thus alleged to be sanctioned, viz., prenuptial unchastity, has never been recognized as a ground of divorce by the Christian Church; and next, that careful examination of the early Christian writers shows conclusively that they held Porneia in this and the cognate passages to mean adultery." We may then regard this point as fairly settled, or at least, as susceptible of no more complete explanation. But the most serious part of the subject remains. If we hold that, for these reasons, a man may send away his wife, then the question still arises, Does this involve the dissolution of the marriage tie, and the dissolution in such

a sense that either or both of the parties may marry? In answering these questions we naturally turn to the history of early Christianity and more especially to the decisions of the early Councils, bearing in mind that the utterances of individual writers must be carefully examined, that we may ascertain whether they are pronouncing personal opinions, or are witnesses for the belief of their age. In the case of a rigorist like Tertullian, for example, we shall know that he is merely speaking for himself. In the earliest days of the Church the question hardly came up. A Christian who had fallen under censure for reasons of the kind here dealt with would probably have lapsed into heathenism and fallen back on the Roman Law which allowed divorce to be effected by consent. The Council of Elvira, however (A.D. 305 or 306), passed several canons on the subject. (See Hefele, Eng. ed., vol. i., pp. 141 ff.). Thus Canon 8 laid down that women leaving their husbands with no preceding cause and marrying others (*quae nulla praecedente causa reliquerint viros suos et alteris se copulaverint*), should not again be received to communion. The following canon (9) determines what should be done to a woman leaving her husband not without reason (*quae adulterum maritum reliquerit*) and marrying another. If she does marry another during her husband's life, she is not to receive communion until the husband she left has died, except in case of sickness (*nisi forsitan necessitas infirmitatis compulerit*). Some canons follow relating to catechumens, which need not detain us here. The Council of Arles (A.D., 314) deals with a different case (can. 10), that of a man putting away his adulterous wife, and decrees that in such a case counsel should be given to the man not to marry again (*placuit ut in quantum possit consilium iis detur, ne viventibus uxoribus licet adulteris alias accipiant*). In the former case, the woman leaving her adulterous husband was forbidden to marry under penalty of excommunication. Here the man is only advised not to remarry. In both cases the Canons deal with the innocent party. The reason for the difference assigned by Hefele (Vol. i., p. 190) is as follows: "Undoubtedly because the existing civil law gave greater liberty to the husband than to the wife, and did not regard the connection of a married man with an unmarried woman as adultery." There is another Canon attributed to this Council somewhat different; but it is regarded as spurious. At the eleventh Council of Carthage (A.D. 407) it was decreed (Canon 8): "Married people who have been separated may not marry again, but shall either be reconciled or live as divorced persons. At the second Council of Milevis (A.D. 416) marriage was forbidden to both parties, in accordance with the decree of Carthage just mentioned. The Synod of Vannes (A.D. 465) decreed (Canon 2): "Those who leave their wives on account of unchastity, and without proof of their adultery marry others, are to be excluded from communion." Upon this Hefele (Vol. iii., p. 16) quite reasonably remarks: "If a man repudiated his wife because of adultery, and married another, this

was disapproved of, yet was not visited with ecclesiastical penance by the Synod of Arles, A.D. 314." Such are the principal authoritative utterances of the Church during the first five centuries. It may be of interest to add some of the statements of opinion by leading divines of the first ages. Tertullian in one treatise dissuades remarriage in all cases to divorced persons, and in another declares remarriage after divorce unlawful. Lactantius holds remarriage permissible in the husband who has put away his wife for adultery. No provision is made for the relief of the innocent woman. Origen and Jerome pronounce remarriage not permissible in such a case; and again S. Jerome declares it to be unlawful in both parties; so does Athenagoras, so Pope Innocent I. Such came to be the judgment of the Western Church, which ultimately declared against remarriage in either case during the life of the other party. Such was the decree of a Council at Nantes (c. A.D. 658), of a Council at Hertford (A.D. 673), of a Council at Friule (A.D. 791). We cannot do better than sum up in the language of Prebendary Meyrick in the Dictionary of Antiquities: The general conclusion that we arrive at from a review of the documents and authorities of the early Church is that, while the remarriage of the guilty party was sternly and uncompromisingly condemned, there was no consensus on the question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the remarriage of the innocent party. After a time an ever-widening divergence exhibited itself on this point, as on others, in the practice and teaching of the Eastern and Western divisions of the Church. Eastern theology at length framed for itself rules shortly expressed in the following canons, found in the synodal decisions of Alexius, who was Patriarch of Constantinople in the beginning of the 11th century. (1) No clergyman is to be condemned for giving the benediction at the marriage of a divorced woman, when the man's conduct was the cause of the divorce. [Here is a concession to the woman unknown in the early Synods]. (2) Women divorced by men whose conduct has been the cause of the divorce are not to be blamed if they choose to marry again, nor are the priests to be blamed who give them the benediction. So too with regard to men. (3) Whoever marries a woman divorced for adultery is an adulterer, whether he has himself been married before or not, and he must undergo the adulterer's penance. (4) Any priest who gives the benediction at the second marriage of parties divorced by mutual consent (which is a thing forbidden by the laws) shall be deprived of his office. Such has continued to be the teaching and practice of the Eastern Church to this day. The question of the legality of the marriage of the innocent party in a divorce has been answered in the affirmative. In the Latin Church marriage is declared to be indissoluble except by a papal decree. The Law of England permits the remarriage of either party when a divorce has been regularly obtained, and grants the use of the Church for such remarriage, but does not require the incumbent of the parish, as in ordinary cases, to celebrate the marriage.