

3. My Commercial Secretary and I took the line with them that the Canadian Government policy in declining to sell any aircraft in the Caribbean area was a blanket policy. That it had been decided on because of the troubled conditions of the last year or two and that it was not aimed directly at Cuba or at Cuba's Prime Minister. Ferrer found it pretty difficult to understand this; he is clearly obsessed with the duties and responsibilities of his job and cannot quite see why he is unable to get a Beaver. In the course of the conversation he remarked that it was quite impossible to arm a Beaver, that he doubted whether it would even carry a gun.

4. Although we were careful to give no encouragement at all, I think that you have not yet heard the last of this request. Cuba's new Ambassador, Luis Baralt, is leaving tomorrow to take up his post and will be in Ottawa next week. He learned of the Beaver affair only this morning and immediately expressed willingness to see whether he could accomplish anything by personal representations in Ottawa. I rather think that Ferrer will try to make sure that Baralt has all the details of their case and that Baralt will sooner or later make an approach on his own in Ottawa.

5. I might interject for your information that I have become quite well acquainted with Baralt. He is an intelligent and well-educated Cuban of the quiet type and speaks good English, having spent a total of about four years in the United States. I think that any approach he may make will be a reasoned and not a belligerent approach.

6. Another sidelight on this affair is that we learned in a conversation with another official a day or so ago, that Dr. Castro, with his heart set on this Beaver aircraft, had been talking in terms of making a personal long-distance telephone call either to the Prime Minister in Ottawa or to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. This may have been no more than an emotional outburst, but just in case Castro might in fact try to put a call through, we suggest that it might be worthwhile to see that the staffs of the Prime Minister's office and the Minister's office are briefed and prepared to deal with it.

7. We shall take no further action here unless we are again approached by the Cubans. In that case, we shall of course immediately report to you again.

ALLAN ANDERSON

469.

DEA/11044-AK-40

*L'ambassadeur au Cuba*  
*au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Ambassador in Cuba*  
*to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

LETTER NO. L-11

Havana, January 6, 1960

SECRET

Reference: Our L-5 of January 5, 1960.

EXPORT OF BEAVER AIRCRAFT TO CUBA

Since the letter under reference was written, my Commercial Secretary has followed up with his U.S. colleagues a remark made by one of the Cuban officials to us to the effect that Cuba has been buying Cessnas and helicopters for non-military purposes during recent months from the United States and is still doing so. The U.S. official confirmed that this is true.

2. I must admit that this puzzles me and I should be most grateful for a clearer explanation of our own Canadian policy. I had understood, evidently in error, that our rigid refusal to sell any