

*Idea of provinces
in Caribbean
not received
enthusiastically*

Asia has continued, with the Colombo Plan expanding to include many non-Commonwealth countries, but the area lost its monopoly with the emergence of the English-speaking countries of Africa and the Caribbean. Canada extended its aid program to include the West Indies Federation after its formation in 1958. Although the Federation itself folded shortly thereafter, Canadian aid did not. Through the Commonwealth Technical Assistance Program, introduced in 1958, members of the Federation and other Caribbean countries received both technical and capital assistance. Earlier suggestions that Canada assume responsibility for the social and economic development of the countries of the region after the British withdrawal, or that the Caribbean countries be invited to join Canada as new provinces, elicited no enthusiasm in Ottawa, but some sense of obligation obviously developed. Caribbean countries now receive the highest *per capita* Canadian aid allocations of any area, though aggregate disbursements and allocations for Asia still remain the highest.

Following the 1960 Commonwealth prime ministers' conference, the Special Commonwealth Africa Assistance Plan (SCAAP), the English-speaking African counterpart of the Colombo Plan, was initiated. In 1960, the Canadian Government pledged \$10.5 million to the Plan and in 1964 and 1965 the commitments were substantially raised. In the first ten years of the Plan, Canadian commitments rose from an average of \$3.5 million a year to \$35.8 million. By 1973-74, this had risen to \$62.67 million.

Anglophone reflection

These three programs and the absence of programs for the *francophone* developing world reflected what was, until the early 1960s, the almost total dominance within Canada of the English-speaking population. But, with the election of the Liberal Government of Jean Lesage in Quebec and the coming of the "quiet revolution", interest increased in the "French fact" in Canada and therefore also in Canada's foreign policy. Canada's relations with the *francophone* Third World have not grown up slowly, as have relations with the Commonwealth. Before 1960, in fact, Canadian relations with these countries consisted primarily of missionary contacts between Quebec and a few French-speaking African countries. But the Lesage influence and the visit to Canada in 1960 by Patrice Lumumba led to pressure for more active relations with *francophone* developing countries.

The apparent failure of the Diebaker Government to recognize both the justification and intensity of Quebec political and cultural desires was reflected in the grudging attention given to *francophone* Africa until the Government's defeat in the 1963 election. Between 1960 and 1963, Canadian aid allocations to French Africa amounted to \$300,000 annually. The Pearson Government boosted this to \$4 million on a non-lapsing basis in the 1964-65 allocations and the *francophone* African assistance budget has since grown more dramatically than that for any other area.

French resistance

Interestingly enough, the new Canadian participation in *francophone* economic assistance initially met resistance in former French colonies from the still-strong French presence. The most important Canadian project in the year 1963-64 was, significantly, assistance in the establishment of the University of Butare in Rwanda, a former Belgian protectorate.

It is certainly no mere coincidence that Pearson's concern over the unrest in Quebec paralleled a dramatic increase in aid to *francophone* Africa. The most obvious connection between Canada's domestic linguistic battles and Canadian aid allocations can be seen in the events following President De Gaulle's explosive visit to Quebec. Following the visit and hints that Quebec was preparing a diplomatic coup in the form of the prevention of Ottawa's attendance at the 1968 Libreville meeting of education ministers, Prime Minister Pearson dispatched Pierre Trudeau to Africa as his personal emissary in an attempt to obtain an invitation to the meeting. But, despite this move and Pearson's offer to Quebec of the chairmanship of a Canadian delegation to the conference, no invitation to the Libreville meeting, or the next one in Paris, was forthcoming. It was at this time that Pearson sent the Chevrier Mission to Africa to appraise the availability of good development projects for Canadian financing. The massive jump (from the \$12-million allocation of 1967-68 and the \$22.1-million allocation of 1968-69) in aid to *francophone* Africa can probably be attributed, therefore, to the very real political necessity of making Ottawa rather than Quebec the focus for development assistance to *francophone* areas.

Canada received an invitation to the next conference, held in Kinshasa, though an unseemly squabble between the federal and provincial representatives over protocol lent a rather farcical air to the new