

called Chan Po-ta, who is now very senior in the leadership, and such as his fourth wife, Chiang Ching. Another Mao tactic that is very typical of the man is that he closed the high schools and turned loose the Red Guards, about which we have all read so much. He also moved very cleverly in the early days to win control of the national newspapers and the national radio network, denying his opponents a forum from which to launch any national counter attack. He has sought very cleverly to isolate his opponents, one by one geographically, and pick them off; and above all, in some ways he has used very cleverly the alleged threat of the Soviet Union of border troubles, and his own tremendous prestige—which really is tremendous—to undermine his opponents and to make any criticism of him an act of disloyalty. So the opponents of Mao Tse-tung, who are very clever men in their own right and know Mao's tactics very well, have been combatting Mao often by claiming that they were the real Maoists, that they knew what Mao was saying, and that they were really interpreting Mao's wishes.

Mao has had considerable initial success, partly because he is a master tactician and partly because of his tremendous charisma, his tremendous popular appeal, but the opposition has been strong from the entrenched bureaucracy and, in some areas of the country, from the army, because the party bureaucracy and the army leadership overlap in many key areas. As a result, today Mao and his supporters claim only to have won relatively few cities and provinces. In February and March there were definite signs of a compromise, undoubtedly partly related to the need to get the spring crops planted. This month we have seen signs of new activity. The Red Guards have been again released on the streets of Peking; there have been new attacks on the chief opponents of Mao, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Nobody really knows how to interpret this, and it would be silly to pretend that any of us really know what is going to happen now. These new attacks could be a sign of weakness and desperation on the part of Mao or they could be the signal of a new move, once the crops are planted and gathered in, against his opponents in the provinces. In the short run the future is very much in doubt. In the long run, it is my feeling that there must be a return to more normal political and economic conditions if only to avoid total administrative and economic disruption. I would say further, if China is to make significant economic progress in the years ahead it seems inevitable to me, and this is a western view, that there will have to be further development of the more pragmatic economic and political policies of recent years; in other words, the Revisionism as Mao Tse-tung calls it, which he so very much abhors, and which he is trying to eradicate. Having said that, I immediately qualify it, in a sense by saying that so long as Mao lives he can never be defeated, such is his prestige. The outcome, therefore, in the short run may never appear to us to be clear-cut and decisive. In the end, I am fairly confident—I do not say this gloatingly because I have a great deal of sympathy for Mao and his aims—that Maoism—that is, not Mao the man but the thought of Mao Tse-tung—will be discredited by his successors in deed, if not in word. They may, and I think almost certainly will, still pay lip service to the man. I doubt there will be an immediate parallel to the de-Stalinification in the Soviet Union, but I think in deeds they will betray Mao as Mao fears they will.

Now, turning briefly, and again at the risk of over-simplification, to the implications for Chinese foreign policy, and specifically the war in Viet Nam, there has been, as far as we can see, little striking change in Chinese foreign