

Efforts to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by efforts to ensure that the further dissemination of nuclear technology is devoted solely to peaceful purposes. The Conference to Review the Non-Proliferation Treaty re-affirmed the Treaty's vital role as the basic instrument of the non-proliferation system. It made it clear that all parties, both nuclear-weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states, must meet their obligations fully under the Treaty. This is essential if the dangers of proliferation are to be averted.

The Review Conference also reaffirmed the role of the Treaty as the basis for wider co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Canada will fulfill its obligations under the Treaty to facilitate, to the extent it is able, international co-operation in the exchange of nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes, particularly between the advanced and developing countries. The need for such co-operation has clearly been increased by the change in world energy costs.

However, I would, at the same time, stress that we have an obligation to ensure that the cooperation we enter into does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices for whatever purpose.

Pre-occupation with the dangers of nuclear weapons must not blind us to the growing threat from use of conventional force. Urgent and closer attention must now be given to the search for arms control and the reduction of forces in order to promote regional stability and mutual security. Now that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has been concluded, we look for substantial progress from the negotiations in Vienna on the reduction of forces in Central Europe.

The basic responsibility for reducing the dangers and burdens of armaments rests primarily with the major military powers. But we must recognize the various constraints under which they operate if we wish effective arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Advances in military technology often complicate efforts to find the technical and military basis for agreement and satisfactory means of verifying commitments. Agreements must promote or be compatible with the security interests of participating states. Disarmament negotiations are unlikely to succeed unless political conditions are conducive to progress.

But this is no argument for inaction in this Assembly. It is no argument for accepting the present and totally unsatisfactory rate of progress in achieving disarmament measures. The General Assembly must continue as the forum of international concern and as a spur to action in the field of disarmament.