sider only immediate political expediency and to ignore the desirability of establishing sound, long-term precedents was considered most unwise by the Canadian delegation. The Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to impose sanctions automatically when so directed by the Security Council. One protection against an abuse of this power by the Security Council is Article 39. To recommend to the Security Council that it disregard Article 39 was to create a most dangerous precedent.

Another example of a long-rum consideration which has determined Canadian policy on an important question is the desirability of the practice growing up that, even though resolutions of the General Assembly are not binding upon Members of the United Nations, Members of the United Nations will in fact abide by resolutions of the Assembly when they are passed by substantial majorities and are in accord with the provisions of the Charter. Canada voted in the Assembly against a clause in the resolution on Spain which stated that the Franco Government should be debarred from membership in international specialized agencies. This clause of the resolution was, however, adopted by the Assembly Committee by a vote of thirty-two to five and later the whole resolution, including this clause was adopted by the Assembly in plenary session by a vote of thirty-four to six. Because of this, Canada has supported in the specialized agencies the action called for by the Assembly resolution.

One of the recurrent themes of controversy in the Assembly is over the relative importance to be attached to "efficiency" and to "adequate geographical representation". This theme has run through innumerable debates on the Secretariat, on the chairmanship of Assembly committees and on the membership of these committees and of the various councils.

Canada was one of the states which pressed at San Francisco for the inclusion in the Charter of a provision that the paramount consideration in the employment of the members of the Secretariat of the United Nations should be "the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity" and that only a vague "due regard" should be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. But the inclusion of this provision in the Charter has been only half the battle and it has been necessary to fight constantly for the primacy of efficiency over considerations of national prestige in appointments to the Secretariat.

As part of that battle the Canadian Government has refused to nominate Canadians for the Secretariat. If national governments press the Secretary-General to appoint their nationals, it makes it extremely difficult for the Secretary-General to carry out his obligations under the Charter. Canada has also insisted that any Canadians who are appointed to the Secretariat of any international agency are no longer in any way responsible to the Canadian Government for their activities as members of the Secretariat. This would seem obvious. However, only recently a representative of a not unimportant power, asked us to reprimand a Canadian, who is an international civil servant, for an action which he had taken as an international civil servant, and which had offended that power.

Most of the constructive work at an international conference is done in its committees and sub-committees. They are the creative bodies on the success of which a conference largely depends. The success of a committee is in turn dependent to a very large extent on the efficiency of its chairman. Incompetent or unscrupulous chairmen snarl the work of committees and lower the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. It is thus of paramount importance that the chairmen of committees and of sub-committees be chosen, as far as possible, on the basis of their personal competence to conduct meetings expeditiously and well.

Unfortunately, at most international conferences chairmen are not chosen on this basis. Instead of an individual being chosen for his com-