

27. BASIC Report 98.4, *Deadly Rounds*, p.25
28. Canada, *Role of Ammunition Controls*, p.25
29. Natalie J. Goldring, "Developing Transparency and Associated Control Measures for Light Weapons", Chapter 17 of *Light Weapons and International Stability*, ed. Singh, p.226 It is difficult to see how any clear picture of extent of the problem can be obtained without some gauge. As well, Goldring points out that the loss of stored weapons kept in insecurely guarded facilities (witness Albania in 1997) might have been avoided if there had been a destruction program in place in the region.
30. This trend has begun already, albeit tentatively and at the discretion of supply-side countries. The Wassenaar Arrangement and the recent European Union Code of Conduct on the Arms Trade, along with a number of writings of experts on the subject, all call for nations to take into account the humanitarian record and whether national weapon controls exist. The withdrawal of foreign aid and embargoes may have a salutary effect in some circumstances.
31. Chalmers and Greene, "Expanding the Register to Include Holdings and National Procurement: Issues and Options", Chapter 8 in *Developing Arms Transparency*, p. 86
32. Bronwyn Brady in "Collecting and Organizing Data on the Manufacture of, and Trade in, Light Weapons", Chapter 7 in *Light Weapons and International Security*, pp.140-151. Even in advanced countries with a high degree of public acceptance for domestic gun control legislation such as the United Kingdom, researchers found information on the production of light weapons difficult to obtain.
33. For a discussion of the potential domestic US position on this subject, see Natalie J. Goldring, *Overcoming Domestic Obstacles to Light Weapons Control*. BASIC Project on Light Weapons paper given to Sandia National Laboratories Annual Arms Control Conference. April , 1997
34. Ravinder Pal Singh, "UN Arms Register: Some Interpretations of Barriers to Transparency and Accountability", Chapter 6 of *Developing Arms Transparency*. Prior public notification of arms transfers would allow public pressure to be brought to bear to change national export or import policy. This will be difficult to implement because of the fear of business intelligence leaks and national security concerns, real or perceived. Although these remarks are aimed at the UN Register of Conventional Arms, the principle would apply to light weapons also.
35. Mitsuro Donowaki, " Addressing Light Weapons and Small Arms Proliferation", Chapter 16 in *Developing Arms Transparency*, p. 208 .
36. Klare in *Light Weapons and International Security*, .pp.14-16
37. Malcom Chambers and Owen Greene. *Five Years and Counting*. pp. 9-11