

- xi) Each component of the verification system had a clear and appropriate mandate. Both parties recognized these limited mandates and consequently, their expectations were, for the most part, limited and realistic.
- xii) The relative insulation of the disengagement process from those unsympathetic to the process — including sub-national groups and guerrillas, as well as other state actors — provided the parties with an uninterrupted opportunity to build confidence in their new relationship over time.

1(b) *Geographic-Physical Factors*

- xiii) The Sinai presented very favourable geographic circumstances for the implementation of the disengagement and verification scheme. The sparsely populated desert terrain offered natural barriers and choke-points that facilitated aerial surveillance and on-site inspections. The Sinai's terrain and physical environment (including the relatively stable climate) was particularly well suited for easy target detection and identification by advanced sensing devices, thereby minimizing false alarms.
- xiv) The parties to the agreements, as well as the participating third parties, had only to be concerned with one contiguous border.

1(c) *Technical-Operational Factors*

- xv) The verification system was configured in such a way as to create interlocking responsibilities among the SFM, UNEF II, and the national surveillance stations along with Egyptian, Israeli and American aerial surveillance. This contributed to the efficient and effective use of resources. Each of these components of the verification system carried out its carefully prescribed role within geographic areas that were limited, manageable and well-defined.

- xvi) The use of mutually reinforcing multiple verification methods (including ground, air and space elements) provided a synergy which enhanced the effectiveness of the entire verification system. Watch stations were installed where observer personnel could monitor unattended sensor fields and identify potential intrusions using high-power binoculars, night observation devices and remotely controlled day and night television cameras. The UNEF, and later the SFM, maintained complete control over the buffer zone and conducted on-site inspections in the adjacent limited forces zones.

US aerial reconnaissance was undertaken over the UNEF buffer zone, the limited forces zones and the Gidi and Mitla passes. Under the terms of the 1979 Peace Treaty, the US undertook more extensive aerial inspections, while Egypt and Israel also conducted aerial inspections within zones adjacent to their national borders as stipulated by the Sinai II Agreement and the Peace Treaty. While never explicitly stated in formal documents, the United States probably conducted satellite reconnaissance missions over the buffer zone and limited forces zones. Whether the results of such space surveillance were ever provided to the parties is not clear; however, the results of aerial reconnaissance were given to the parties.

The final component of the verification system was the procedures for dealing with complaints and ambiguous situations concerning compliance. These procedures included the Joint Commission under Sinai II and the Liaison Committee under the 1979 Peace Treaty.

- xvii) At the operational level, the verification mission was unambiguous and comprehensive. The verification mission included (A) observing, documenting and reporting on activities in areas defined by the disengagement agreements and the Peace Treaty; (B) patrolling borders separating