

the occupation of, and piercing loopholes in, walls and houses. Of course, if banks and ditches in a suitable position exist they may be utilised. His great point seems to be that the disposition of the defenders should not be regulated by that of the hedges, palings, walls, and houses, but by tactical consideration, since all these apparent defences offer good marks for the enemy's artillery, and the two last are positively dangerous from the stones and bricks sent flying when struck. If, however, the enemy has no artillery, or its fire is not effective, high substantial walls may be placed in a state of defence by means of loopholes and platforms on trestles. The most important thing is that there should be a free field of fire from 500 to 800 paces broad. Capt. Von Mirbach sensibly remarks on a mistake which is too general in every army, viz., that of allowing the men of the firing line to show themselves till they can fire with effect. As a rule, the attacking party, while yet a long way off, have the line of defence and the strength of the defenders in the front line clearly shown to them. Besides, it is useless to expose men who are not firing to the effect of the enemy's artillery, or stray bullets from the enemy's infantry. As to the disposition of the small supports, they ought to be kept together so as to be within reach of the commander's voice. He particularly impresses on the reader that they should never occupy a house. As he points out, how can an officer in a house of several storeys exercise command over his men, and direct their fire? How can he evacuate the house when the troops on his right and left retire? Besides, a single shell well directed will disgust forever an officer from occupying a habitation. There are, however, exceptions, such, for instance, as isolated farms surrounded by thick and high walls. These farms may sometimes prove useful as points *d'appui*, but only the outer walls should be lined. With one important remark of our author we shall quit our examination of this part of the book. That is, that when the assailant arrives within thirty yards of the defenders' firing line, the latter ought not to cease firing in order to charge with the bayonet. We will quote his very words:—

"At this moment a murderous fire will produce more effect than a charge with the bayonet, which would be half a failure, because only executed by a few men on account of the difficulty in making the word of command understood. The companies in reserve ought alone to execute this charge. As the latter advance, the fire of the firing line will increase in intensity, and will soon attain its maximum of violence, but as soon as they shall have approached within twenty to thirty paces of the line, officers and sergeants will exert all their energy in causing the fire to cease. . . . The men of the firing line will remain lying down, the columns will pass them by and march against the enemy."

We now pass to the portion of the book which is headed "Attack." The advance against a hostile position generally commences at from 800 to 1,500 metres—the metre being a little over three feet three inches. Our author points out that to the private soldier the essential difference between the defence and the attack is that the *tirailleur*, or man in the firing line, in the former only occupies one position, while in the latter he occupies several successive positions. Assuming the order of attack at from 800 to 1,500 metres, the advance of the *tirailleurs* will be made at the ordinary pace. As soon as the enemy's fire begins to tell, which is between 1,200 and 1,000 metres, the *tirailleurs* halt occasionally and fire. The distance between each position should be between 250 and 100 metres. Sometimes during this stage the line of *tirailleurs* advances by successive echelons, i.e., one part of the line advances to the next position, while another part remains halted and firing till the advanced position halts and opens fire. Then the portion at first left behind in its turn advances. We would observe with regard to this advance of the *tirailleurs* or fighting line by echelons, that the echelons should be of, considering length, not less than 100 yards in front, and in preference more; that great care should be taken by the commanders of echelons to preserve the right direction; and that the smaller the front of each echelon the shorter distance it should advance. A little consideration will show how important attention to these two points are; how certain it will be if they are not attended to that the echelons in rear will, in the first place, find it difficult to avoid hitting their own comrades in front, and, in the second place, how probable it will be that the rear echelons when they in their turn advance will find themselves shut out of the line. So strongly do we feel on this subject that we urge the advisability of advancing in echelon from one flank only. Indeed, we would suggest that recourse should not be had to an advance in echelon during the first few hundred yards after the opening of the defender's fire.

Our author recommends that, arrived at 700 to 500 metres, the advance should be accomplished by successive "bounds" of at first from 150 to 100 metres, and afterwards from 80 to 60 metres. During the period of successive bounds it is evident that as a rule it is not desirable that the *tirailleurs* should fire on the move, especially as the bounds should be made at the "double." Hence we arrive at the conclusion that whatever may be the case during the first period of the attack, the pushes should be made by echelons under cover of the rear echelons,

and in this case each rush should be short, say fifty yards, by small bodies, and from one, or both flanks of bodies of 200 men. Much, however, depends on the nature of the ground and the efficacy of the enemy's fire.

(To be Continued.)

The Queen's Jubilee.

THE Imperial military authorities are busily preparing for the celebration of the Queen's Jubilee next June by an unprecedentedly large and representative review of the forces of the Crown at Aldershot. The suggestion has, it is said, been under consideration that representative bodies of troops from the colonies should join the British regular and auxiliary forces to do honor to the occasion. It will be remembered that as far back as last winter a suggestion of this nature awakened considerable approval in Canada, though little has been heard of the matter since. It is not improbable that the Imperial Government would be willing to provide transport for such colonial corps, if this would prove any inducement. In the meantime it is pointed out in Canadian military circles that the only way to ensure success would be for some particular regiment or regiments to show readiness to meet their own expenses in other respects than that of transport, as it is felt that no system of provisional battalions selected by Government could prove satisfactory to the men themselves, or to the authorities.—*Canadian Gazette.*

Correspondence.

The Editor desires it distinctly understood that he does not hold himself responsible for the opinions expressed by correspondents.

JUBILEE YEAR.

To the Editor of the Canadian Militia Gazette.

SIR,—Would it not be a capital opportunity for the government to celebrate the jubilee of Her Most Gracious Majesty's long and successful reign, by granting to Her colonial militia outward and visible signs of acknowledgment for their past services? The Canadian militia is, as it at present exists, the creation of an act of the Dominion Parliament, passed in 1868; accordingly, those who joined the force in that year have served, if still in the ranks, 18 years. Would it not be a most gracious mark of favor, and a practical recognition of loyalty, if a Long Service medal were granted to all officers and men who have served in the militia of Canada 18 years; while badges worn on the arm, as in the militia at home, might be issued to men, for shorter periods of service (such as one stripe for 4 years, two for 5 years, three for 9 years, four for 12 years, and five for 16 years, with the medal for 18 years service). The badges to be worn on the left arm, as good conduct stripes are at home, instead of the unsoldierlike stars given to the English volunteers for long service. Some such recognition of the value of our services would not only make more popular the militia force among young soldiers, but would tend to keep veterans in the ranks, without whose presence no regiment can ever hope to excel either in the field or on parade. Those who have put in service with the Queen's colors, prior to joining the Canadian militia, should, of course, be allowed to count the term of years served towards the right of wearing the medal or bars respectively. The cost of medals would be small, while the fact of the possibility of a man's being able to earn such a decoration in the future would, I feel sure, help recruiting, more than even the presence of rich company officers in regiments.

A SCOTS GUARDSMAN.

MONTREAL, 10th Jan., 1887.

MEDALS FOR THE FENIAN RAIDS.

To the Editor of the Canadian Militia Gazette.

DEAR SIR,—Permit me, as a "veteran" of the 1866 and 1870 campaigns, to suggest to the government (if our petition, as regards the giving of medals, which is about to be presented to it, be granted) that there is no necessity actually of applying to the Home authorities for the medal. Would not our fifty cent piece make a pretty medal? Then why not give us these in this form—keep the obverse intact, and erase on the reverse all inside the maple leaf wreath, and have that part engraved appropriately. The expense would not be very much, as there are not over 500 or 600 of us now. Here is a pretty medal at once, whilst the twenty-five cent piece would make a pretty "miniature." I would further suggest the medal, with a clasp for 1870, for those who served both years, and simply the medal to those who served in one campaign only. An inscription worded something this way would do—"Fenian Raid, 1866" (or 1870, as the case may be). I should like to see the opinions of others on this question. We certainly are entitled to some slight recognition of our services at the government's hands.

Yours truly,

R. SULLIVAN DAVID,
Major, late 6th Fusiliers.

December 23, 1886.

HOW MANY OFFICERS HAD THE SHOEBOURNESS TEAM IN 1886?

To the Editor of the Canadian Militia Gazette.

SIR,—In the Montreal *Witness* of 31st December, 1886, I noticed a very interesting account of the officers who were first and second in command of the artillery team sent to England last year, with a good portrait of each officer. I believe that the selection of these two officers was made by the council of the Dominion artillery association. Can you tell me by whose authority the third officer's name and portrait appear in the same account as *third in command*? I was not aware that the D.A.A. were authorized to send three officers, so that if that governing body did not make this third appointment, who did, and by whose authority?

Yours,

A MEMBER OF THE D.A.A.