

extent of arable land opened up by this route will equal that of any other; that more extensive resources will be developed—because, in addition to Agriculture and Lumbering, and all the resources of any other line, this one only will encourage the vast fisheries of the Bay of Chaleurs, of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and of the Lower waters of that river, and by this means will be of incalculably greater benefit to the whole Dominion.

The manner in which this is shown is substantially as follows:—From River du Loup to Apolauqui, Major ROBINSON'S survey shows the distance to be 347 miles; from Moncton to Truro is 109, making 456 miles to build. These, at Major ROBINSON'S estimate of \$35,000 per mile, will amount to \$15,960,000. Now, Mr FLEMING, in his report, gives the distance by his Central line from River du Loup to Truro, to be 452 miles, and estimates it at \$46,000 per mile. This will amount to \$20,792,000, showing a saving in construction of \$4,832,000. In distance to be run, he shows a saving thus:—Mr. FLEMING gives the distance of his Central route, from River du Loup to Halifax, as 572 miles; while by the Northern Central (the Nova Scotia portion of the road being common to both) the distance is only 570 miles, showing a saving in distance of two miles in favor of the latter. But he also shows that, in point of time, the Northern Central will have the advantage from the greater speed at which the trains can travel over the easy gradients of that line, compared with the enormous grades of the Central proper. In the latter route the rise and fall is over 5,000 feet, while in the former 750 feet is the highest summit to be surmounted. Mr FLEMING shows by his table of gradients that those of the Central proper will run as high as 70 feet per mile for eleven miles continuously, ascending South, and 9 6 10th miles ascending North, and almost all are over 45 feet, while the grades he gives for the worst part of the Northern Central reach only 60 feet in one instance of 2 7 10th miles, while they are generally from 20 to 30 only, and much more favorable than those of any other line given by Mr FLEMING.

He shows that the Northern Central will run through counties in which greater interests will be developed. These are enumerated, and figures are given from reliable public documents to bear out his statements. He shows more population to the mile, for which figures, taken from the last Census of New Brunswick and Lower Canada, are produced. We have not space to give these tables, and must refer our readers to the pamphlet itself, which is well worthy of careful reading. So far as we can perceive, the writer has made out a strong case in favor of the Northern Central Line, and until his "facts and figures" are shown to be false, and his other arguments fallacious, we shall consider the claims of this line as superior to those of any other yet proposed. Our columns are open to any writer who will discuss the question in a fair and gentlemanly manner, and within reasonable limits as regards space.

There are two appendices to the pamphlet in the first of which Mr LAWRENCE'S letter to the Hon Minister of Works is reviewed, and we must say that the manner in which Mr. LAWRENCE'S duplicity is exposed cannot fail to lessen the influence of his letter. The manner in which Mr LAWRENCE has twisted figures to make for his line and against others, and his meanness in garbling an extract from Mr FLEMING, in order to make an argument against his line tell in favor of it, is sufficient to throw doubt over every statement in his letter.

The second appendix is a review of the pamphlet lately issued by WALTER BECK, C. E., and he fares little better than Mr LAWRENCE. In fact, Mr. BECK'S undisguised partisanship, in bolstering up the Frontier line by arguments of any kind that would deceive his unsuspecting readers is full exposed, and this exposure cannot fail to undo any impression favorable to the Frontier line that his advocacy may have procured for it. Unscrupulous partisans almost always overshoot the mark, and in striving for an unfair advantage they generally lose that influence which a fair advocacy would secure for them. We may recur to this subject.

#### PROGRESS OF THE ABYSSINIAN EXPEDITION.

The daily journals begin to publish letters from special correspondents en route for Abyssinia, but none of them seem to have got farther than Aden or Bombay. At the latter city the expedition is as popular as it is unpopular at home, coming as it does to vary the monotony of an Anglo Indian soldier's life. The rest of India seems equally sanguine. The *Friend of India*, one of the leading Anglo Indian papers, considers that "the difficulties are trifling enough, and become less so as our information enlarges;" and a wild scheme, worthy of Colonel Hatch, for sending two hundred volunteers into the heart of Abyssinia (one patriot actually offering to embark £2000 in the speculation), has been discussed by a portion of the press in all soberness and gravity. The other day, when the first regiment had to sail, the 10th Native Infantry required a few men to complete their number, so many volunteers came forward from two regiments in garrison with them that the 10th could have doubled their strength in an hour. The army is in capital temper and spirits, and has complete confidence in its chief. As the chief difficulty against which the army will have to contend will probably be that of transport over precipitous mountains and narrow defiles, the one great object which is being steadily kept in view throughout the preparations, and to which all others are made subordinate, is light equipment, of a kind always, if necessary, adaptable to mule carriage. More than half the native soldiers who go to Abyssinia in the transports will live for ten days or so on parched corn. Omnipotent and capricious caste, though it allows them to eat and sleep, will not allow them to cook when on the "black water," so they are given rations of parched grain, with a little sugar and ghee to flavour it and water to wash it down. Of the followers or non-combatants, who, being mostly of a lower caste than the soldiers, are less troubled with scruples of this kind, the great majority will as soon cook on board ship as anywhere else.

The correspondent of the *Times* says.—"I should be sorry wantonly to harrow the British taxpayer's feelings, but it may perhaps be as well to mention a fact or two that may help to prepare him for the little Abyssinian account in store for him. The expenditure of the Commissariat Department, for food in Bombay itself alone, not counting money spent in other parts of this Presidency or elsewhere, and exclusive of transport, purchase of animals, medical stores, &c., is estimated at £100,000 a month, and the expedition is not to advance into

Abyssinia until it has seven months' food actually collected, and a three months' reserve guaranteed ready as soon as wanted. Heavy as this is, the cost of transport is proportionately heavy.

The place chosen for debarkation is Analey Bay, 20 miles south of Massowah, lat 15 15 N., long. 39 45 W.; the bay faces towards the north, Anchorage good in deep water. It is approached from the south coast without any unusual difficulty, all the obstacles being visible. The land is a sandy plain, with patches of brushwood, but no forest. It abounds with large and small game. Drinkable water is not to be found within 16 miles of the coast, but at that distance a good and abundant supply was discovered in one of the deep ravines which intersect the country at right angles at the coast line. All the troops that can be spared will be at once marched up to this high land, but large working parties will be required to land stores, make piers, &c. A number of Chinese carpenters accompany this brigade to put up commissariat sheds, which have been made in Bombay, ready to be at once fitted. The water for these working parties will require to be supplied from the ships. Colonel Merewether's party were busily employed in making a pier to land troops and stores.

#### SOUTHERN TALK.

(From "Black and White," by Henry Latham)

A Southern gentleman speaks as follows. "The South made a great mistake in not sticking to the old flag: it is not to be told how many sailors were lost by this mistake. The South made another terrible mistake in not sending all the cotton out of the country before the blockade was formed; it would have put us in funds. When Lee surrendered we had come to simple starvation. For six months before that, the soldiers had not enough to eat. On the morning of the surrender, we knew something was going to happen, for General Lee had dressed himself, contrary to his custom, in full uniform. When the soldiers crowded round him, he told them there was no prospect left but starvation or surrender. Many of the men shed tears. We had been drawing our last supplies from Georgia, and Sherman marched right through it. Towards the end of the war, the Northern cavalry did terrible service. They covered the country in advance of the line of march, and burnt the depots before our tired troops reached them. It was killing work at the end of a long day's march, when we expected food, to find the depot destroyed. Sometimes the soldiers scraped up from the ground the horse corn which the enemy's cavalry had dropped. Our troops were often short of ammunition; and victories have been claimed by the North because our troops retired when they had not another shot to fire.

MILITARY.—The formal opening of the drill shed at Caledonia took place on Friday evening, the 22nd ult. and was we are pleased to learn, most successful. The ball was one of the pleasantest that has ever been held at Caledonia. The attendance was large, and everything passed off most happily. Those who were fortunate enough to be present speak gratefully of the exertions of the committee, who spared no pains either in preparation or on that evening for the comfort of their guests.—*Sachem*.