

for authority, instead of being elected by the men.

In the United States the people are the "Sovereign," and all power originally proceeds from them and therefore the election of officers by the men is the common rule. But an Army is not a popular organization, but is an animated machine; an instrument in the hands of the Executive for enforcing the law, and maintaining the honor and dignity of the nation, and the President, as the constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, should exercise the power of appointment—subject to the confirmation of the Senate—of the officers of "volunteers," as well as of "regulars."

No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action; and the power must come from above, not from below; the President usually delegates his power to the Commander-in-Chief next below, and he to the next, and so on down to the lowest actual commander of troops, however small the detachment. No matter how troops come together, when once united the highest officers in rank is held responsible, and is consequently armed with the fullest power of the Executive, subject only to law and existing orders. The more simple the principle the greater the likelihood of determined action, and the less a commanding officer is circumscribed by bounds and by precedent, the greater is the probability that he will make the best use of his command and produce the best results.

The Regular Army and the Military Academy at West Point, have, in the past provided and doubtless will in the future, provide an ample supply of good officers for future wars; but should their numbers be insufficient, we can always safely rely on the great number of young men of education and force of character throughout the country, to supplement them. At the close of our Civil War, lasting four years, some of our best corps and division generals as well as staff officers, were from civil life, but I can not recall any of the most successful, who did not regret that he had not received in early life instruction in the elementary principles that underlie the art of war, and which he had been forced to acquire in the dangerous and expensive school of actual war.

But the real difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain an adequate number of good soldiers. We tried almost every system known to modern nations, all with more or less success. Voluntary enlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes, and I think that all officers of experience will confirm my assertion that the men who voluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war, were the best, better than the conscript, and far better than the bought substitute. When a regiment is once organized in a State, and mustered into the service of the United States, the officers and men become subject to the same laws of discipline and government as the regular troops. They are in no sense "militia," but compose a part of the Army of the United States, and only retain their State title for convenience, and yet may be principally recruited from the neighborhood of their original organization. Once organized the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomes difficult to obtain more recruits the pay should be raised by Congress, instead of tempting new men by exaggerated bounties. I believe it would have been more economical to have raised the pay of the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to have held out the promises of three hundred and even six hundred dollars

in the form of bounty. Towards the close of the war, I have often heard the soldiers complain that the "stay at home" men got better pay, clothing, and food than they who were exposed to all the dangers and vicissitudes of the battles and marches at the front. The feeling of these latter should be that in every event, the sympathy and preference of the government is for him who fights, rather than that for him who is on provost or guard duty to the rear, and like most men, he measures this by the amount of pay. Of course the soldier must be trained to obedience and should be "content with his wages," but whoever has commanded an army in the field knows the difference between a willing, contented mass of men, and one that feels a cause of grievance. There is a soul to an army as well as to the individual man, and no general can accomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul of his men, as well as their bodies and legs.

The greatest mistake made in our Civil War was in the mode of recruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by the necessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up at the bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from the best non-commissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise new regiments, with new colonels, captains and men, leaving the old and experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeleton organizations. I believe with the volunteers this matter was left to the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept her regiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generally filled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that we estimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade. I believe that 500 new men added to an old and experienced regiment, were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of a new regiment, for the former by association with good experienced captains, lieutenants and non-commissioned officers, soon became veterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year. The German method of recruitment is simply perfect, and there is no good reason why we should not follow it substantially.

On a road marching by the flank, it would be considered "good order" to have five thousand men to a mile, so that a full corps of 30,000 men would extend six miles, but with the average trains and batteries of artillery the probabilities are that it would draw out to ten miles. On a long and regular march the divisions and brigades should alternate in the lead, and the leading division should be on the road by the earliest dawn, and march at the rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a half miles an hour, so as to reach camp by noon. Even then the rear divisions and trains will hardly reach camp much before night. Theoretically a marching column should preserve such order that by simply halting and facing to the right or left it would be in line of battle; but this is rarely the case, and generally deployments are made "forward," by conducting each brigade by the flank obliquely to the right, or left to its approximate position in line of battle and there deployed. In such a line of battle a brigade of three thousand infantry would occupy a mile of "front," but for a strong line of battle, five thousand men with two batteries should be allowed to each mile, or a division would habitually constitute a double line with skirmishers and a reserve on a mile of "front."

(To be Continued.)

RIFLE COMPETITION.

HALIFAX COUNTY RIFLE ASSOCIATION.

We are indebted to Lieut. Win Imlah for the following account of the recent matches at the Halifax Bedford Ranges.

The annual shooting match of the Halifax County Rifle Association took place at Bedford Range yesterday. Col. McPherson, 2nd H. G. A., was in command. The day was admirably suited for shooting; and a large number from the various volunteer corps assembled on the range. The old Wimbledon target was used, and taking this into consideration, the scores made displayed some excellent shooting. The following are the scores:—

FIRST COMPETITION, \$105.

Ranges 200 and 300 yards, 5 rounds each. Prizes T1

1st prize, Silver Medal and \$12—			
	Pto Merson, 66th.....		33
Capt Bland, 1st G A.....	\$12		32
Sergt Bishop, 63rd.....	1)		31
Capt Graham, H F B.....		0	31
Gun Watkins, 1st G A.....		8	30
Pto Gibson, 63rd.....		7	30
Sergt Corbin, 63rd.....		6	30
Lieut McInnes, 63rd.....		5	30
Sergt Kennedy, 66th.....		5	29
Capt Piers, R M.....		4	29
Sergt Murry, 1st G A.....		4	29
Sergt Suckling, 63rd.....		4	29
Corpl Hickey, 64th.....		3	29
Sergt Willot, 2nd G A.....		3	29
Corpl Bates, 66th.....		3	29
Sergt H J Harris, 1st G A.....		3	29
Capt Herbin, 66th.....		2	28
Sergt Shyster, 66th.....		2	28
Sergt Stevens, 66th.....		2	28
Lieut Mumford, 63rd.....		2	28

SECOND COMPETITION, \$115.

Ranges 300, 500 and 600 yards; 5 rounds each. Prizes Pts.

1st prize, Gold Medal and \$15—			
	Sergt Bishop, 63rd.....		50
Capt Graham, H F B.....	\$15		48
B S M W Harris, H F B.....	12		48
Lieut Mumford, 63rd.....	12		47
Sergt Sheppard, 63rd.....	8		47
Sergt Taple, 63rd.....	7		45
Sergt Connors, 63rd.....	6		45
Sergt Corbin, 63rd.....	5		45
Capt Herbin, 66th.....	5		45
Corpl Hickey, 63rd.....	4		44
Surg Treramin, 66th.....	4		43
Pto Merson, 66th.....	4		43
Pto Adams, R M.....	3		42
Capt Bland, 1st G A.....	3		42
Sergt Power, 63rd.....	3		41
Sergt Fader, 66th.....	3		41
Gun Chapman, 1st G A.....	2		41
Sergt Willot, 2nd G A.....	2		41
Gun Marshall, 1st G A.....	2		40
Sergt Harris, 1st G A.....	2		40

THIRD COMPETITION, \$50.

Consolation Prizes—Open to all members of the Association who have not taken Prizes. Range 400 yards. Prizes Pts

Sergt Birkhead, 66th.....	\$5	18
Private Stanford.....	6	17
Lieut Walsh, 63rd.....	5	17
Sergt Henderson, 66th.....	4	17
Qtr-Master Sergt Self, 66th.....	4	17
Lieut McCrow, 1st G A.....	3	17
Lieut Dart, 2nd G A.....	3	17
Private Hooper, 66th.....	3	17
Gunner Bland, 1st G A.....	3	17