

3. With respect to sub-heading (6) of Item 2, "Whether Single Instrument or More", it should be borne in mind that the Australian Government has actually prepared a draft treaty and no doubt has fully matured views on what instruments will be required to cover the terms of the peace settlement and any other necessary supplementary agreements.

4. It should also be noted that the next item on their main agenda is "Machinery for Securing Achievement of Basic Objectives of the Allied Powers". The sub-headings under this item indicate that the Australians probably also have some fairly specific proposals to put forward on this subject. It is likely that their views on this question will be more fully developed than those of any other delegation.

5. It is apparent that the order in which the items appear on the Australian draft agenda is intended to enable the Australian delegation to maintain the initiative throughout the Canberra conference. Under the order of business which the Australians have proposed their delegation will be able to put forward at an early stage in the conference concrete proposals for the post-treaty regime of control and the form of treaty required. It is even possible that Dr. Evatt may seek to interpret the absence of any other equally well developed counter-proposals or any strong opposition to Australian plans from the other delegations as indicating some degree of concurrence on their part in the Australian proposals. Furthermore, Dr. Evatt will probably take pains to impress on other delegations that Australia's contribution to the defeat of Japan was second only to that of the United States and that she is more immediately concerned in the Japanese peace settlement than any other Commonwealth country. Arguing from these premises he will try to leave the strong impression with other Commonwealth delegations that Australia has a right to be consulted and that in effect her "prior consent" should be obtained before other Commonwealth countries adopt policies at the general international conference at variance with Australian policies expounded by Dr. Evatt at Canberra.

6. It would be particularly undesirable from the Canadian point of view for the impression to get abroad that Commonwealth countries had "agreed" early in their talks on the form of the peace treaty and the post-treaty control machinery for Japan. Press reports of the first day or two will probably set the tone for subsequent publicity, and it would be unfortunate if these reports, whether based on corridor gossip or press releases, indicated that Commonwealth delegations were making "rapid progress towards mutual understanding" on such important subjects as the methods and means for implementing the peace settlement. Insofar as the order of the agenda as proposed by Australia may give Dr. Evatt an opportunity to create this kind of impression it would be tactically advantageous to us to endeavour to have the order of business changed. Furthermore, if the Australians are the only ones to put forward detailed proposals on the form of the peace treaty and control machinery they may endeavour to have their proposals on these subjects used as a framework for the subsequent conference discussions on basic objectives with respect to disarmament, economic provisions, reparations, etc.

7. The Canadian Government has indicated that in its opinion items 1 - 9 of the Australian draft agenda, quoted in paragraph 2 above, and the outline contained in Commonwealth Relations Office Circular D. 543 of June 20 (see paragraph 11 below) might form a useful basis for the conference agenda. It might be well, however, for Canada to suggest that an alteration be made in the order of business. It might be pointed