

service on Canadian realities, etc, etc.

One of the principal problems will be to keep the lunatics in leash. I have already heard them talk of working the people up to fever pitch, forcing the U.S. into war by provocative tactics; and I have noted in my letter to Heeney how dangerous and short-sighted this is liable to be. But if you are going to control the lunatics, you will do it better with two or three watchmen than with two or three score. A single person, maintaining personal contact at key points and with the distant authority of the P.M. behind him would, I am sure, have greater influence than a machine engaged in departmental and familiar routine - and liable like any department in the public eye, to be a public jest if it blunders (cf. the growing-pains of the C.B.C. and the furious criticism of the British Pantehnicon).

The very intangibility of the Information set-up I suggest, would probably be its principal asset.

I have simply noted the principle involved. We could work it out in greater detail if necessary but, really, it all comes down to a choice of imaginative and active personnel; and four, five or six chosen absolutely because of their qualifications for the job - and with no other considerations whatsoever allowed to enter - would do the trick.

Yours sincerely,

John Pearson
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