

do not perceive feelings detached from a self or subject that feels, but in every case I perceive a self that is in the act or state of feeling. This is an essential distinction to be borne in mind. I perceive not isolated and detached feelings, ideas, or volitions, but the feelings as I—the self—feel them; the ideas as I think them; the volitions as I will them.

The feelings, ideas, and volitions are phenomenal or dependent beings existing in and through a self which is their substance; but the self is known to be a noumenon, an independent being—a being that can originate activity in itself and others; it is a free being and a moral personality.

We see by this that the act of introspection is worthy of the most careful study, because of the high character of its object. But the most important thing to notice here is that external perception has to be re-enforced by introspection in order to enable it to perceive organic beings and their phenomena. This is a point which has escaped the attention of many of the students of physiological psychology. They speak of objective methods of studying the mind, and take frequent opportunity to disparage introspection as an old and discarded method of studying the mind. This all comes from ignorance of the history of psychology, and especially from lack of familiarity with the works of the great thinkers in this field. If one has mastered Plato's *Republic*, *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, *The Laws* (especially the tenth book), *Theætetus*, and *Timæus*, he will never speak disparagingly of the results of inner experience. If one has (not a mere grammatical or philological, but) a scholarly acquaintance with Aristotle's