Supply

or the metropolitan fleet from France, with a quota merely addresses the symptom of the problem and does not deal with the problem itself, which is the boundary dispute.

In January of 1987 you will recall, Mr. Speaker, how an agreement was reached, that agreement I referred to earlier, wherein the Government of Newfoundland and the Minister of Fisheries had been dealt right out of the negotiations. An agreement was reached between Canada and France which was supposed to set out the process for determining, first, the conditions for the application of the 1972 treaty after December, 1986, when the French fleet was required to leave the gulf area; and, second, the process by which the maritime claims of both countries off the coast of Newfoundland would be determined.

As I pointed out, this agreement in January of 1987 was reached without the knowledge of the Government of Newfoundland. The Government of Newfoundland was not informed that the team was going to France for one last round of negotiations. It was just left out. It was a kind of oversight.

Mr. Epp (Thunder Bay—Nipigon): No wonder he considered leaving politics.

Mr. Manly: It was interesting that that agreement was signed in Paris during the tenure of our former ambassador to France, Lucien Bouchard, who is now the Prime Minister's hand-picked Secretary of State. He will be attempting to run in a by-election. It should be very interesting to see what the results of that by-election will be.

Under his tenure the Government of Canada offered the Government of France unspecified access to northern cod in the 2J3KL zone off northeast Newfoundland, something that had never been proposed before, and something that had been done without the consent of the Government of Newfoundland. It is as though we were offering to give away the hydroelectric resources of Quebec, or some of the mining resources of northern Ontario to some foreign power. That is what we did with the cod stock off the coast of Newfoundland. We were obviously trying to entice the French with these vital fish stock into accepting some kind of binding arbitration process for the boundary dispute. In 1987, in January, we were willing to grant the French access to our northern cod in the hope that there would be eventual acceptance of binding arbitration.

In April of 1988, just last month, we were offering to settle the question of quotas for French fishing vessels without ever addressing the boundary issue in a non-binding mediation process. We have had one retreat after another. We have given away one thing after another.

For 1987 the French were given a total quota in Canadian waters of 22,265 tonnes. In the disputed 3PS zone the French have already taken more than 26,000 tonnes of cod in spite of the fact that for that zone the quota was set at about 6,400 tonnes.

If we look at the importance of this issue we see that there are about 70 fishing communities and 5,000 fishermen located along the south coast of Newfoundland who depend on the resources of the 3PS zone. In both Newfoundland and the gulf region there are an estimated 30,000 fishermen and plant workers who are affected by any decrease in the resource, this resource that is being so heavily threatened by French overfishing. The total annual estimated value of the fishery in this area is \$35 million. Yet the French have been continually overfishing in the 3PS zone, and the Canadian Government continues to negotiate with France and to grant concessions. Even after the January 1987 agreement, it took the Canadian Government two additional months to respond to the flagrant French overfishing.

In March of 1987 the Burgeo Bank was off limits to the French, and we closed Canadian ports to French vessels. In June the French responded by another deliberate provocation by issuing two oil licences in the 3PS zone, not that there was any great intention of drilling at the present time. It was just a deliberate provocation.

In August, at the Franchphonie summit, the Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney) appointed a long time personal friend, Yves Fortier, to be Canada's negotiator on the Canada-France issue. When the talks resumed in September, we hoped to be able to negotiate allocations for the French fleet for the years 1988 to 1991, but in October the French walked away from the table. They wanted to settle only on the issue of quota and not on the boundary issue. That was their goal. The Canadians were reluctant to do that at the time. Now, however, we have agreed.

In conclusion, I think that Canada has to take a much stronger position. If Canada had taken a stronger position two years ago on this issue it could have led to a solution, instead of being the international patsy that we are that has allowed us to fall into this present situation.

The people who are suffering are the small fishers on both sides of the issue, both in Newfoundland and in St. Pierre and Miquelon. They are the ones who suffer.

We want to join in condemning the Government for its failure to resolve the dispute. The settlement of the boundary dispute—not just the quota for the French but the settlement of the boundary dispute—has to be seen as the principal issue that has to be resolved. That should be reserved to international and binding arbitration without either party insisting on preconditions such as the access by the French to northern cod. While that is happening there should be an agreement between Canada and France to restrict fishing in the 3PS zone to a level that is not going to endanger stocks.

Finally, the Canadian Government should be looking at this in a total context of all Canada-United States relations. If anyone wants to ask a question on that point, I would be glad to answer it.