

*Supply—National Defence*

have, rests largely now on what the United Kingdom 1958 defence white paper called the balancing forces of mutual annihilation. As this deterrent is, in my view, so important in the maintenance of peace, surely our contribution to it, our attitude to it, should have a bearing on Canada's defence policy. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, though I am straining the patience of the committee, I should like for a few minutes to examine the nature of this deterrent and what our relation in Canada should be, what can it do, what can it not do, and what contribution should we, as part of our contribution to collective security, make to this deterrent. But in discussing this we should remember that this nuclear deterrent, however powerful it may be, may not prevent direct limited military action. It may not prevent indirect military action. It may not prevent the catastrophe of miscalculation. It will not prevent, however powerful it may be it will not hinder and indeed it may even facilitate economic penetration and political subversion. Therefore it has its limitations.

If the deterrent, however, is our main protection at the present time against all-out war, how much nuclear power is needed to deter? How far do you have to go before deterrent power is sufficient to deter? And if you go further the additional power is not only unnecessary and wasteful, but more weapons on the other side cancel out your own increased power, and both sides are merely wasting money, energy and power itself.

This kind of deterrent by force may, I admit, be absolutely essential at the present time against attack; but its use, if it ever had to be used, is also an assurance of the destruction of yourself as well as the enemy. Therefore if both sides have this power and cannot be prevented from using it in retaliation against an attack, then neither side will dare use it. It becomes sterilized, and paradoxically the objective of defence policy and even defence strategy is to keep it sterilized.

Yet, while we would be afraid to use it because of its results against ourselves, we might slide into such use by the nature of our defence against what might be a limited aggression. We might—and this is one of the major dangers that confront the western alliance today—by the very nature of our collective arrangements convert little wars into big wars. The minister himself in statements he has made has, I think, suggested this when he expressed scepticism about whether it would be possible to start with a minor and limited defence against a limited aggression using, if you like, tactical nuclear weapons in a limited way; whether it would be possible to start these, without going to the ultimate weapon of the hydrogen bomb and all that this implies.

The United States position is certainly all-important in this matter, but that position seems to me to be dangerously ambiguous. The army chief of staff, General Taylor—I think he was army chief of staff until a few weeks ago; I do not think he is now—had this to say to a subcommittee of the Senate on March 11, and I quote from his testimony:

We must have a real shield of NATO forces on the ground to reassure NATO that indeed we do have some response other than general war to any aggressive action. The most likely way to have a general war is either to back into it, to have a limited operation expand into a bigger operation or perhaps to have a miscalculation of a gross kind on the part of one side or the other.

I suggest those are very wise words indeed. But the President of the United States had this to say at a press conference, I believe, on the very same date, and these are words which certainly rang around the world:

We are certainly not going to fight a ground war in Europe.

That is, the United States. What is the alternative? An atomic air war of mutual destruction? But the President added at the same press conference:

I don't know how you could free anything with nuclear weapons.

Yet he had just said only a short time before, "We are not going to fight a ground war in Europe." Well, Mr. Chairman, what voice has Canada in resolving what I can perhaps call the ultimate dilemma? Where do we stand? What is the answer to all this? What can we do to find the right answer?

I believe we have to retain, and I have to say it, the nuclear deterrent now in the hands of the United States—I wish we could do without it—and in part in the hands of the United Kingdom, to be used only after a collective NATO decision except in retaliation to an all-out, massive, sudden assault when there would be no time for consultation, indeed perhaps no time for anything else. To throw away or to urge the United States to throw away the nuclear deterrent does not seem to me to involve any service to peace but, indeed, might be a provocation and temptation to aggression on the part of a state which retained it. If we could do so by international agreement, of course, that would be the perfect solution.

But while I feel we have to retain this horribly devastating nuclear deterrent in the interests of the uneasy stalemate on which peace now rests, I believe also that there should be a shift of emphasis in the west pending an agreed reduction in armaments, a shift of emphasis also in NATO, a shift of emphasis and priority of resources from total