on the substance of a treaty. As far as the substance is concerned, we wish to see a formula which would ensure that the nations possessing nuclear weapons -- or nuclear powers -- be limited to the existing five, and that the control of nuclear weapons not be allowed to pass to other countries. We are satisfied that this can be done without interfering with legitimate defensive arrangements of alliances.

We think it important that a treaty include an effective provision for verifying that obligations undertaken are observed. Article III of the present U.S.A. draft treaty, which would call upon all signatories "to cooperate in facilitating the application of the IAEA or equivalent international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities", would contribute both to the effective working of a non-proliferation treaty and the strengthening of the international safeguards system. If provision were also made for the application of international safeguards on a mandatory basis to all foreign transfers of fissile materials, as is indeed already the policy of the Canadian Government, a safeguards article would itself become an effective obstacle to further proliferation.

While I am on this point, I should like to refer to the following part of a statement made by the representative of Czechoslovakia at our 1432nd meeting: "At the tenth general conference of the IAEA in September of this year in Vienna, the Delegation of Czechoslovakia, together with the Delegations of the Polish People's Republic and the German Democratic Republic, expressed its readiness to accept agency guarantees for its nuclear installations if West Germany and other non-nuclear NATO members act in the same way". I think it would be of interest to members of this Committee to note the response to this proposal which has been made by the Federal Republic of Germany, as set out in a press release of today's date: "The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has noted with interest proposals by Poland and Czechoslovakia to place their nuclear facilities under the safeguards of IAEA. The German Government appreciates the statements by Poland and Czechoslovakia as a significant step towards putting the use of nuclear energy under international safeguards also in states of Eastern Europe. The proposals by Poland and Czechoslovakia are being considered very seriously by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, together with other member states of the European atomic community."

The Canadian Delegation welcomes this evidence of increasing interest and of moves towards the extension of the safeguards of IAEA over various nuclear installations in Europe and elsewhere.

Since it is impossible to distinguish between the technology required for nuclear explosions for military and for peaceful purposes, we consider that the countries not possessing nuclear weapons should give up the right to conduct nuclear explosions for any purpose whatsoever. Such action on their part would, of course, have to be subject to an undertaking to establish a service under international supervision which would make available at a fair cost nuclear explosive services for legitimate civil projects whenever such explosions become technically and economically feasible, and provided they are consistent with test-ban treaty obligations. This would ensure that the benefits of controlled nuclear explosions would be generally available at minimum cost without incurring the drastic political and military consequences of the further national development of nuclear bombs.