First of all, both countries have in the past endorsed the idea of joint technical studies in the field of chemical and biological weapons. During the first round of the negotiations, the United States Delegation offered to bring such studies forward from the first stage of disarmament to the present negotiating period prior to the signature of a treaty. We have not had a reaction to this suggestion from the Soviet Delegation, but, from their proposals of September 23, 1960, we assume that they are not opposed to the idea of a study in this area. Furthermore, we have evidence of numerous statements that the Soviet Union is anxious to make an early start in dealing with weapons of mass destruction in general. The Conference should therefore agree now on an immediate study of this question. We must stop the arms race in this area - chemical and biological warfare - which could only add new horrors to those we already know. We have enough horrors at the present time without adding these additional ones.

Problem of Method and Degree

Second, there is the elimination of nuclear weapons and fissile material. Under the United States plan, the production of fissile material for weapons purposes would be stopped in the first stage, and transfers from past production to non-weapons purposes would begin. This process would be carried forward during the second stage until nuclear weapons, and fissile material for use in their fabrication, would have been reduced to so-called "minimum levels". While containing no provisions on this in Stage I, the Soviet plan calls for all such weapons and their components to be destroyed in Stage II. What then is the difference between the two sides? One calls for complete reduction and the other for reduction to "minimum levels" by the end of State II. Surely these statements show that the main problem is one of method and degree - how precisely to bring about these reductions, and when. In our opinion, agreement on these questions can be reached by a more intensive effort.

Third, there is the question of eliminating nuclear weaponscarriers; the issues involved here are among the most central to the negotiations and there are considerable differences between the two great powers. Both plans call for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles. If the differences were only of staging and timing, there would indeed be ample room for negotiations and compromise as to what might constitute a mutually acceptable, balanced and verifiable reduction. But while, under the United States outline, the powers move towards the total elimination of nuclear-weapons carriers by a 30 per cent reduction in the first stage and by a balanced elimination of the remainder in Stages II and III, the Soviet Union claims that complete abolition could be achieved in the first stage. The discussions in this Conference have shown that a 100 percent reduction in the first stage would be incompatible with the principle of balance to which Mr. Menon referred this morning and would raise grave verification problems. I am convinced that opportunity for genuine negotiations will exist only if neither side holds to totally uncompromising positions.