

3.2 Multilateral Verification and Arms Control Agreement  
(Continued)

purpose of such an activity? Since questions as to the legality of activities would not arise, by definition, the observation of legally sanctioned events would either be pointless, or would simply serve to enhance the accuracy or breadth of information available to those with access to the output of the Paxisat system. In the latter case, it is likely that those states whose systems and activities would be under surveillance (primarily the Superpowers) would be opposed to such a development.

This, in turn, might pose certain problems:

- (a) the operation of Paxisat might itself be perceived as the hostile act, acting to increase precisely those tensions which the system was presumably designed to reduce.
- (b) As a matter of practical politics, it is questionable whether states allied with either Superpower would seek to engage in activities which were opposed by the US or USSR.
- (c) Should the only purpose of Paxisat be intelligence gathering, it is doubtful whether the states whose resources would be required to put Paxisat in place would consider the expense justified.
- (d) Depending on the identity of the states involved in operating Paxisat, there would arise real questions as to the willingness of these states to share intelligence, and practical problems as to who would direct the system to look at whose activities.

In conclusion, such a scenario over and above the specific issues just outlined, is not an arms control or verification scenario. Simply put, to postulate the operation of Paxisat without reference to a specific arms limitation regime is to postulate the development of a system whose only role could be to gather information about military activities sanctioned by international law.