

Nations; constitutes the only norm of non-dissemination which up to now has been generally accepted. It calls on all states to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing a reciprocal set of undertakings: an undertaking by the nuclear states not to relinquish control of nuclear weapons, or to transmit the information necessary for their manufacture to states not possessing such weapons; and an undertaking by states not possessing nuclear weapons to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring control of such weapons. There is a pressing need, in my judgement, for the elaboration of an international agreement or agreements on that basis.

TACIT UNDERSTANDING

This would mean starting with a notion of how to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons that is well known and whose limitations are fully understood. The adoption of the reciprocal pledges contained in the Irish resolution would not result in any nation being deprived of such provisions for its security - nuclear or otherwise - as it may currently enjoy. And the nuclear powers would only be giving formal recognition to a tacit understanding which has governed their relations for the last few years - namely, that they will not hand over the undivided or independent control of nuclear weapons to states which do not already possess them.

I have in mind, for example, as part of such an overall system, an extension of the present safeguards procedures. As these procedures stand, they apply essentially to assistance derived by one country from another in the peaceful uses of the atom. They do not, on the whole, apply to a country's

peaceful nuclear programmes to the extent that they are carried out without outside assistance. That may be one direction, therefore, in which we could move forward, looking to the day when nuclear and non-nuclear states alike might be prepared to put all their non-military nuclear programmes under the safeguards procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

PROBLEM OF CONTROL TRANSFER

There is another direction in which progress may be possible. The present safeguards procedures are designed to prevent the manufacture of nuclear weapons. They do not relate to the transfer of control of such weapons. That suggests that the time has come when it might be useful to consider some supplementary mechanism which would deal with situations where there has been an alleged or suspected transfer of control of nuclear weapons by one state to another. I can envisage a role being played by the Security Council or regional organizations, as the case may be, in the operation of such a mechanism.

In recognition of the acceptance of those constraints and their contribution to the building of international confidence, it should, surely, not be beyond the collective genius of the nuclear powers to provide those non-nuclear states which are either non-aligned or neutral and which evidently regard the option of being able to become nuclear powers at some future time as a factor contributing to their national security with a credible guarantee against nuclear attack. This would not, of course, alter in any way their non-aligned or neutral status....

GUARANTEEING NON-NUCLEAR STATES

Accordingly, it may be necessary, first - and I think it is necessary - to guarantee the security of such non-nuclear states. It is not sufficient to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. It is necessary to say that nuclear states will not use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states in a way which would result in the non-nuclear states being unable to enjoy their national security. This is a guarantee of the kind which is needed to ensure that non-nuclear states can enjoy their national security. It is a guarantee of the kind which is needed to ensure that non-nuclear states can enjoy their national security. It is a guarantee of the kind which is needed to ensure that non-nuclear states can enjoy their national security.

INDICATIONS OF RESTRAINT
In the past, those powers which do not possess nuclear weapons have, however, largely been taken by two of them to reduce the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and by a third to decrease its planned rate of increase in the output of weapons material. These are welcome indications of restraint. It is desirable to encourage such indications of restraint. It is desirable to encourage such indications of restraint. It is desirable to encourage such indications of restraint.