threatened the peace. They realized that "brushfire" fighting had to be snuffed out before it spread in dangerous directions.

By the mid-fifties, members were beginning to believe that, although the Charter security system had its weaknesses, there existed possibilities for mobilizing United Nations "fire brigades" by making use of the main organs -- the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat -- in varying ways. The idea of stand-by units in national establishments had been included in the "Uniting-for-Peace" resolutions, but had not been acted upon with any vigour.

A NEW KIND OF PEACE MACHINERY

Thus, when the Suez crisis broke, the General Assembly acted swiftly in establishing and deploying the United Nations Emergency Force. This was a new kind of international peace-keeping machinery, but it was based on a growing recognition that in specific situations the United Nations was obliged to deploy military forces for peaceful purposes. Because it was novel, UNEF was to a large extent experimental. The United Nations had, in previous years, developed experience of truce-supervisory bodies, which included unarmed military observers. There was also the underlying concept in the Charter about the deployment of military forces. But the main requirement in November 1956 was for a rapidly-improvised force which frequently seemed in danger of dying at birth.

This trend in United Nations evolution continued in the late fifties. In 1958, United Nations political and military presence was found useful for promoting stability in Lebanon and Jordan. Much of the credit for the practical arrangements made at that time goes to the ingenious improviser guiding the Secretariat, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold.

CONGO CRISIS

Then there was the major crisis in the Congo, which also required United Nations action. On that occasion, the Security Council acted and the Soviet Union supported the decision to establish an international military force. The Congo was a long and arduous test of the effectiveness of this kind of United Nations machinery. It provoked a major crisis within the organization, largely because of disagreements about the conduct of the operation.

It also resulted in a major financial crisis, which continues to this day. The financial dilemma was caused not by institutional weaknesses in the United Nations but by the deliberate failure of some members to discharge their financial responsibilities. They attempted to hamper the United Nations operation in the Congo by withholding financial support. They revived old arguments which had been used in the forties about the United Nations' competence to discharge its primary responsibility of maintaining the peace.

PIECEMEAL FINANCING

The heavy burden of peace-keeping costs, both for the UNEF and the Congo force, and the negative attitude of some states as regards payment of their obligations, have required some improvisation in the methods for financing those peace-keeping operations. These *ad hoc* methods have not been very satisfactory, although they have been based on the principle of collective responsibility. There have been shortages in the payment of assessed shares, which have made it necessary for a few member states to make additional voluntary contributions to buy United Nations Bonds, to waive amounts recoverable. Such improvisations seemed necessary to meet the emergency situations which had arisen.

Other improvisations have been made as regards the operations last year in West New Guinea and Yemen and, most recently, in Cyprus. The first two operations were financed mainly by the parties to the dispute. The Cyprus operation, during the first months, has been financed through voluntary efforts on the part of a small number of member states. Canada regards the financing arrangements for Cyprus as being most unsatisfactory, not only because of the heavy burden placed on a few shoulders but because the principle of collective responsibility in the United Nations has been ignored up to the present time.

For many years, Canada has taken the lead in urging upon other members the need to place the peace-keeping operations on a firm financial footing. It is unjustifiable that the peace-keeping role of the United Nations, with the significance which it has for world peace and international relations generally, should rest on a flimsy base. Arrangements must be made to ensure that the organization has adequate resources, not only for carrying out peace-keeping operations but all its activities. This Canadian policy is being pursued energetically, in private consultations with many other states and in public debates in the appropriate bodies of the United Nations.

A parallel policy which the Government has been pursuing for some time is to explore all possibilities for developing United Nations preparedness to engage in peace-keeping operations. As a result of Canadian participation in virtually every United Nations peace-keeping operation, we are convinced that the organization itself and individual member states can and should take steps to improve the arrangements for assembling and deploying international peace-keeping forces.

CANADA URGES PEACE-KEEPING STUDY

This conviction lies behind Canada's current efforts to arrange a working-level meeting of experts with actual peace-keeping experience to exchange views and to pool ideas on the special military problems which have arisen out of past peace-keeping operations. Like Canada, a number of other states -- Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands -- have earmarked within their national establishments military units intended for United Nations service, if such units should be requested by the United Nations.

We are aware that still other member states are interested in this practical approach to the problems of international peace keeping. Most recently, His Imperial Highness, the Shah of Iran, made the welcome announcement that his country would be earmarking military units for United Nations service. The proposed meeting of experts was intended to