

It was later noted by the Secretary-General in his report to the General Assembly on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that this mission heightened the need for practical answers to questions such as incentive programmes, the level of stability required before programmes could be implemented, and codes of conduct for supplier states. He stressed the requirement for an adequate level of personal security in countries plagued with a proliferation of light weapons if micro-disarmament is to work.³⁹

As a complementary step in micro-disarmament 2,642 rifles, machine guns, grenade launchers and pistols, all in good working order were collected and destroyed in Mali in March 1996. These weapons were turned in as result of negotiations implementing a cease-fire agreement between the Government of Mali and the Tuareg Rebellion leadership. The programme was voluntary and the destruction method, a public bonfire, served to publicize the campaign.⁴⁰

Rwanda. What will be examined here is *The International Commission of Inquiry for Rwanda* established by UN Security Council Resolution 1013 on 7 September, 1996. The mandate of the Commission was, in summary and among other things, to: investigate reports on the sale or supply of arms to former government of Rwanda forces in violation of UN Security Council resolutions; to identify those aiding and abetting the illegal acquisition of arms; and to recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms.⁴¹

Like the Sahara-Sahel Mission this mandate was to address directly the issues, implications and solutions regarding light weapons proliferation as a destabilizing contributor to intrastate violence. While the Commission's work is not yet complete, there are still some interim lessons that may prove useful, particularly as the conflict is still ongoing. In the view of Brigadier Alam, a member of the commission, "since the Rwandan genocide was carried out primarily by the Government forces and related militia, the arms used were also primarily supplied through legitimate Government-to-Government contracts"⁴² This points to a very important and difficult aspect of controlling light weapons proliferation in terms of legitimacy. Klare notes that according to research conducted by Human Rights Watch, Egypt supplied \$6 million of arms to Rwanda mostly 60 mm and 82 mm mortars and ammunition, 2000 RPG-7 (anti-armour weapons), anti-personnel mines, AK-47 rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition. Similar weapons were also purchased from South Africa,

³⁹ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. *The Secretary-General's Report to the General Assembly on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters*. UN General Assembly Document A/50/391, 1995.

⁴⁰See "Micro-Disarmament in Africa." *Disarmament Times*, May 1996; also, some of this information came from discussions with a Canadian member of the original Advisory Mission.

⁴¹ United Nations. *UN Security Council Resolution 1013 (1995) 7 September 1995*

⁴²Brig M Alam, Untitled Paper presented at the Regional Workshop on Small Arms, Pretoria, South Africa 23-25 Sep 96.