

whatever structure the superpowers have managed to erect. And the only piece that has full effect as a treaty binding the two superpowers now is the ABM Treaty.

Well, seen in that light, it is a very modest accomplishment. Public opinion is entitled, I suppose, to be jaded to a degree when it hears people say, "Well, we're maybe on the verge of actually negotiating the reduction - perhaps the elimination - of a whole category of nuclear weapons." But as against that, it is worth recalling that the first proposal for deep cuts in strategic weapons was made by President Carter; and that the offer to negotiate on that basis was rejected by the Soviet Union at the time, more or less without even opening the mail. It was rejected out of hand.

Then in its last year, the Carter Administration, of course, was totally preoccupied by the hostage situation in Iran. The Reagan Administration came to power with the view it had of the SALT II Agreement and with great reluctance even to embark on negotiations. I remember very well having been present at the first visit President Reagan paid, I think it was in March, after his inaugural, to Ottawa. Mr. Trudeau was then our Prime Minister. One of the things that Mr. Trudeau was pressing on him was that the allies of the United States expected the new United States Administration to re-open negotiations on nuclear arms reduction with the Soviet Union. President Reagan at the time smiled and was affable and pleasant and committed himself to absolutely nothing. You will recall it took a long, long time, in fact, before negotiations were even launched. Therefore, I think that Mr. Trudeau was entitled, at the low point, to feel that somebody had to say something dramatic on the subject to try to shake people out of their torpor. He was trying I think to encapsulate a certain mood, and to send a message in that sense. He chose to do it without consultation and as an independent move. But I guess he felt the circumstances were so extraordinary that they justified that. But look at the distance we have travelled since: the Administration which spurned SALT II at the outset, and would not consider in the first year or so even the thought of nuclear negotiations, is now deep in negotiations of various kinds with the Soviet Union. And - who knows? - we may actually see by the end of this year the first fruits. Well, that is what we all hope. Maybe it will not happen. Maybe there will be frustration and disappointment again. But for all that it's a damn sight better than what we were looking at, let's say, five and six years ago.

[HILL] There are a whole lot of other questions I would like to ask but I know your time is limited, and I would just like to ask one further one about this period when you were Ambassador to NATO. How useful a focus for Canadian foreign policy is NATO, in your view? For example, I mean, how good an instrument is it for Canada to work through in order to pursue its goals of international peace and security, as well as its own particular national interests? In your response, could you say why, based on your experience of that period?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think it is indispensable. Of course, there are a number of important Canadian goals that cannot be pursued usefully in NATO. There are some hopes that we had of the organization in its earliest days that have not been realized. To the extent that these hopes were based in permanent Canadian interests, we have to pursue those interests in other international bodies and in other ways. NATO turned itself, over time, into a defensive military alliance, which, with its important political dimension, is really the key consultative agency for preparing the Western position in debates on European security and Atlantic security.

That's far from saying it is the only forum in which we can pursue our interests. Obviously we are also active participants in the CSCE and the MBFR negotiations. We have a whole set of well-established bilateral relations with all the European countries. So far as defence matters are