

(Mr. Imai, Japan)

Second, if we were to try to circumvent the above situation by laying down a comprehensive ban, we might rule out existing or future peaceful use which could be made possible through technological development.

Third, it would be just as inappropriate to provide for an unduly strict ban on those substances which have peaceful uses as it would be to provide for a loose regulatory régime on account of the peaceful uses.

Fourth, if the regulatory régime were to be extended to cover too wide an area of the chemical industry, its implementation could become impractical, thus creating disenchantment with such a régime.

Fifth, we should not forget that the problems related to the day-to-day management of the convention (namely, the composition of the secretariat, procedures for decision-making, etc.) are matters of delicate political balance.

These and other questions should be taken fully into account and considered together with the varied situations States find themselves in, so that a solution acceptable to all may be developed. I might add that the five points enumerated above are not necessarily unique to the case of chemical weapons. They are common to wide ranges of modern technology for which the distinction between military and peaceful uses is often found in the domain of subjective judgement.

With regard to our work for the present year, I submit for consideration the possibility of holding separate expert group meetings to draw up a list of chemicals and precursors in accordance with guidelines to be developed. I realize that for the past three years or so, the experts have not held that kind of a meeting but have basically participated in the general considerations directly, providing inputs from the expert's point of view. I would be the first to acknowledge that the utility of this approach has been well proven. At the same time, I feel that it may also be useful to reconvene an experts' meeting to deal with matters of a purely technical nature.

When discussing questions of verification in relation to chemical weapons, I believe that we are assuming an integrated system of routine verification as a basis for the structure of operations, which seems from time to time to have taken secondary place in the considerations due to very active discussions concerning challenge inspections. The working paper my country submitted last year dealt with a part of the problems regarding routine verification activities by showing how it could be possible to utilize various sensors and equipment, and we hope that this and other relevant proposals would be discussed further.

Though all States seem to be in agreement concerning the need for challenge inspection, differing views have been expressed as to the concrete formulation for such verification. We feel that the significance of challenge verification lies in ensuring compliance with the future convention and thus assuring security for all States, in other words, in its deterrence role. With such a perspective in mind, we should undertake a full examination of the question in search of a feasible solution.

In such work, much consideration should be given to the various reasons concerning which one among the possible different modes of challenge inspection might have to be invoked, together with the time frame and scenario