

suppression of peaceful public rallies (demonstrations, meetings, etc.) the Soviet side believes that such a provision would be far-fetched, incompatible with the dignity of people and tending towards human rights violations.

I would also mention that from our study of the proposed United States definition of chemical weapons we have been unable to understand the United States position on incapacitants, namely, whether their use for law enforcement should or should not be banned.

I should also like to point out the following. In the context of permitted activities, the United States draft convention focuses entirely on the relatively small quantities of supertoxic lethal chemicals that could, under the future convention, be produced or retained by the parties for protective purposes. At the same time the draft actually ignores the same chemicals, regardless of their quantity, once they are officially intended for peaceful purposes. Production of such chemicals is permitted at all commercial enterprises, with no restrictions whatsoever on the number of such enterprises or on the transfers of such chemicals. The proposed quantitative limitations are also unclear. This approach provides a basis for any State, should it choose to violate the convention, to produce the most dangerous of the prohibited chemicals in any amounts it might need.

And finally, I will touch upon one more issue which the Soviet delegation gave special attention to in its last statement on chemical weapons. I am referring to the tasks and functions of the Consultative Committee to be established under the future convention. As we have already emphasized, we attach great importance to formulating the provisions on the organization and functioning of such a Committee. In order to facilitate further negotiations on this issue, a group of socialist countries intends to submit to the Conference a working paper devoted to the organization and functioning of the Consultative Committee. We hope that the working paper of the socialist countries will be taken as a basis for the solution of this issue.

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The discussions on the verification of a treaty have so far mainly been focused on the monitoring capabilities of certain verification systems. Such capabilities are usually expressed as the detection and identification threshold which can be achieved with a high degree of confidence. Verification of a test-ban treaty, like verification of any disarmament measure, involves also other aspects.

As we see it, the purposes of such a verification system are: first, to deter the parties to a treaty from conducting clandestine activities; second, to provide confidence that the parties to the treaty observe the treaty obligations; and to counteract unfounded suspicion about naturally occurring events.

The verification situation must be looked upon from two different sides; the monitoring side and that of a potential evader. From the monitoring side the system is assessed in terms of what can be observed with a high degree of confidence. A potential evader is, on the other hand, considering which clandestine tests he could carry out with a small risk of being detected.

It is reasonable to assume that a potential evader is not prepared to accept a detection risk exceeding 1-10 per cent, whereas confidence levels of 90-95 per cent have been discussed as requirements for confident monitoring.

The detection and identification capability of any verification system depends on the level of confidence we are considering. As an illustration, a certain seismic system that has a 90 per cent probability of detecting and identifying an event in a certain area might have a capability of detecting and identifying events less than one third that