Chief Justice of England expressed his "despair of any beneficial result," and the question had far better be let alone, than adopt principles and practices well nigh exploded in the country which gave them birth, and the baneful effects of which, when formerly in operation in this Province, are yet patent to demonstration. To give force to these views, it is sufficient to say that by this measure the former complicated machinery is resuscitated in *extenso*, and Bankruptcy Courts and Courts of Review—*ex-officio* and appointed Commissioners, Barristers, of not less than ten years standing—Official Assignees, and endless legal and hampering restrictions, are proposed to form the medium, through which is to be exhibited to creditors, the delectable entertainment of *dividendal dissolving views*, which is far from being calculated (however profitable to the exhibitors), either to edify or amuse the victimized audience on their compulsory attendance. Nor are the principles of the measure less objectionable than the machinery. In any Bankruptcy Law, the great standing point of debate is, what shall constitute Acts of Bankruptcy; and in respect of these, the same objectionable features obtrude themselves as appertained to the former Act, while in addition to its clauses which are reproduced verbatim, and under which a writ of Bankruptcy may be served on any individual trader as a speedier and surer method of screwing out the collection of ordinary debts, the additional provisions throw a cloud of uncertainty over both debtor and creditor, for a period, which to a sensitive or honest minded man cannot but paralyze his energies—harass his mind, and lead to the very result which it is every man's object if possible to avoid, and if possible avert. It is a total misapprehension of the true principles of Bankruptcy, to do anything which shall give it the character of a transition or dubitable state—on the verge of the precipice to-day—placed in comparative safety for a short respite to-morrow, this is the old mythological punishment of Damocles with the sword suspended over his head by a single hair—talk of such an Act being for the *relief* of Insolvent Traders. Surely the words "after torture," have been omitted after "relief!" A man ought to be brought to the gates of Bankruptcy through whatever action is competent *at common Law alone for the recovery of debt*, (and we all know that in this Province these are ample and stringent, not to speak of costly enough withal) but beyond a man's own innate intelligence that his *circumstances may be driving him among the breakers of Bankruptcy—that* he is *vergens ad inopiam*, the Law should not even whisper the word in his ear. Practically at common Law he may be placed in such a position without knowing that he commits an act of Bankruptcy, as shall be sufficient to enable his creditors *to put him in*, if he refuse to serve their interest by *going in* through their advice, and the statutory consent; but it should be a step of the most deliberate nature, and never resorted to until all other resources fail both creditors and debtors, when it is gone into alike in the interests of all, and then only can it be characterized as a "relief." Such are the principles that obtain in Scotland, where Sequestration or Commissions of Bankruptcy sued out *without the debtors consent* (and mark well that it cannot be done *without the creditors consent*) are rare exceptions to the rule. But to return from this digression to the measure before us. Another objection to it is, that by some of its clauses under the very lax and dubious phrases of "in contemplation of Bankruptcy"