

election of one branch of the Federal by the State legislatures, secures an absolute dependence of the former on the latter. The biennial exclusion of one-third will lessen the facility of a combination, and preclude all likelihood of intrigues. I appeal to our past experience, whether they will attend to the interests of their constituent States. Have not those gentlemen who have been honored with seats in Congress often signaled themselves by their attachment to their States? Sir, I pledge myself that this government will answer the expectations of its friends, and foil the apprehensions of its enemies. I am persuaded that the patriotism of the people will continue, and be a sufficient guard to their liberties, and that the tendency of the constitution will be, that the State governments will counteract the general interest, and ultimately prevail. . . .

If we recur to history, and review the annals of mankind, I undertake to say that no instance can be produced by the most learned man, of any confederate government that will justify a continuation of the present system; or that will not, on the contrary, demonstrate the necessity of this change, and of substituting to the present pernicious and fatal plan the system now under consideration, or one equally energetic. The uniform conclusion drawn from a review of ancient and modern confederacies is, that instead of promoting the public happiness, or securing public tranquillity, they have, in every instance, been productive of anarchy and confusion—ineffectual for the preservation of harmony and a prey to their own dissensions and foreign invasions.

The Amphictyonic league* resembled our confederation in its non-al powers; it was possessed of rather more efficiency. The component States retained their sovereignty, and enjoyed an equality of suffrage in the federal council. But though its powers were more considerable in many respects than those of our present system, yet it had the same radical defect. Its powers were exercised over its individual members in their political capacities. To this capital defect it owed its disorders and final destruction. It was compelled to recur to the sanguinary coercion of war to enforce its decrees. The struggles consequent on a refusal to obey a decree, and an attempt to enforce it, produced the necessity of applying to foreign assistance; by complying with that application and employing his wiles and intrigues, Philip of Macedon acquired sufficient influence to become a member of the league; and that artful and insidious prince soon after became master of their liberties.

The Achaean league†, though better constructed than the Amphictyonic in material respects, was continually agitated with domestic dissensions, and driven to the necessity of calling in foreign aid; this also

* An early form of Grecian confederacy.

† A league formed in later Grecian days.