sumption, not only that such persons, sooner than make a statement which might prejudice themselves, would commit deliberate perjury, but that, if they did so, juries would be incapable of detecting the falsehood. A more unfounded calumny upon the veracity of witnesses, and the intelligence of juries, cannot be well imagined.

TAYLOR *on Evidence*, vol. 2, p. 1087.—Although at the time when these sections first came into operation, learned Judges might have been found, who, taking a cautious view of the subject, were inclined to regard the examination of the parties as a questionable, if not a very dangerous, experiment; it is believed that, at present, every eminent lawyer in Westminster Hall will most readily admit that this change in the law has been productive of highly beneficial results. In Courts of law, it has not only enabled very many honest persons to establish just claims, which, under the old system of exclusion, could never have been brought to trial with any hope of success; but it has deterred at least an equal number of dishonest men from attempting, on the one hand, to enforce a fraudulent demand; and, on the other, to set up a fictitious defence. The knowledge that a party might tell his own story to the Court and Jury has operated strongly as an encouragement to the suitor who was the witness of truth; while the dread of cross-examination, and consequent exposure, has had a corresponding tendency to check litigation, in cases where a verdict could only be obtained through the medium of perjury. In Courts of Equity the same advantages have arisen, so far as respects the power now first granted to parties of giving testimony in their own favor; while Defendants, who, under the former law would have been forced to file cross-bills for the purpose of "scraping the conscience" of Plaintiffs, have been enabled to effect that desirable object without having recourse to this dilatory and costly proceeding. The Common Law Commissioners have expressed an opinion