tration of debentures is made to constitute a lien on the real estate of the Corporation, having priority according to the date of registration. Assuredly such a system of registration will, as the preamble suggests, "tend greatly to the increased value of debentures issued under the authority of by-laws of Municipal and other Corporate bodies passed for the purpose of raising moneys, and also for the better security of the holders of the same." The bill deserves the greatest support, and the greatest praise. It is pleasing to find men in the position of legislators alive to the requirements of their age, endowed with sagacity to contrive and ability to perform that which is for the public good. Of this class of legislators the introducer of the measure under consideration is becoming one of the most useful and distinguished.

APPEALS TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

In other columns we present our readers with a report of the decision of the Privy Council in the case of *Supple* v. *Gilmour*. The judgment of the Court of Error and Appeal of Upper Canada confirming the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, (5 U. C., C. P., 318,) is upheld.

It has always appeared to us strange that the defendant Gilmour resisted the demand of the plaintiff in this cause. The delivery before the loss of the timber, the subject matter of the sale, was as perfect as could be the delivery of a raft of timber. The raft was, pursuant to defendant's instructions conveyed to his boom and there moored. Nothing more remained to be done by either party to complete the delivery. Afterwards the raft was destroyed by a storm. The question was upon whom, vendor or purchaser, the loss should fall. By the contract the right of property in the timber passed from vendor to purchaser. By the delivery at defendant's booms the possession also passed. From this time the raft ceased to be the raft of Supple and became that of Gilmour. The loss of it after much litigation, it is now finally decided, is the loss of Gilmour and not of Supple,—a decision which accords alike with common law and common sense.

We think there ought to be some check on the right of appeal to the Privy Council. Were the plaintiff in this case, Supple, a poor man, the result might have been that sickened and cruelly impoverished by protracted litigation, he would have been too glad to have accepted anything, however small, offered to him by the defendant, one of a wealthy and extensive trading firm. It so happened that the plaintiff is a man of considerable wealth as well as defendant, and rather than be baffled fought from Court to Court until the final conflict in the presence of Royalty. There ought to be in all suits equal justice to rich and poor—and equal justice there cannot be where it is in the power of one party by means of his riches needlessly to protract litigation.

The section of the Error and Appeal Act, (20 Vic. cap. 5,) which provides that in all cases of a motion for a new trial upon the ground that the judge has not ruled according to law, if the rule to show cause be refused or if granted be afterwards discharged or made absolute, the party decided against may appeal, *provided* any one of the Judges dissent from the rule being refused, or when granted being discharged or made absolute as the case may be, or *provided* the Court in its discretion think fit that an appeal should be allowed, &c., (s. 15) is sound in principle. The principle of it might, we believe, with much advantage to suitors be extended to appeals to Privy Council contemplated by s. 46 of 12 Vic. c. 63.

MUNICIPAL LAWS.—DISSOLUTION OF UNIONS.—EFFECT ON COUNTY OFFICERS.

In our number for April last, we pointed out a conflict of decisions on this branch of law. We showed that while the Court of Common Pleas had expressed one opinion, the Court of Queens Bench, apparently without being aware of the opinion of the Common Pleas, expressed one wholly different. We declared our inability to reconcile the decisions,—the one being that of *Carter* v. *Sullivan et al.*, 4 U. C. C. P. 298, and the other being that of *Glick* v. *Davidson et al.*, 15 U. C. Q. B. 591. We are as much as ever unable to do so.

We have now a still more recent case in the Queen's Bench, wherein *Glick* v. *Davidson* is upheld, and *Carter* v. *Sullivan* commented upon and doubted. This case is reported elsewhere. While in reference to *Carter* v. *Sullivan*, the Chief Justice of Queen's Bench thinks the question was not much "gone into," Mr. Justice Burns does not hesitate to say, "I have attentively considered the case of *Carter* v. *Sullivan*, on the construction of those statutes but confess my inability to take the view adopted in that case." Thus the conflict of authority as much as ever exists and the breach if anything is widened. Until the question is either settled by a Court of Appeal or the legislature, our remarks made in April must stand as they are written.

We have examined the New Municipal Bill, but cannot find that it proposes to help us out of the difficulty. Indeed we cannot discover that s. 37, of 12 Vic., cap. 78, is with or without amendment, to be re-enacted. Probably the commissioners deeming it a temporary provision have omitted it. If they have done so they have done wrong. Not only as to Counties already disunited, but as to Coun-