

when the Senate was first established, would it not be equally just, equally fair, equally reasonable, that this same rule should apply to the Senate in later years. Can my hon. friend give any reason why this rule, being acted upon once, should not always been acted upon? Can he give any reason why this rule having been once observed should be disregarded afterwards? Why, Sir, the Senate is of such a character that rule should be maintained at all times. Let me call again the attention of my hon. friend to the statement we find in the memoirs of Sir John Macdonald by Mr. Joseph Pope, which bears directly upon the contention that I lay down. I quote from the second volume of this work, page 235 :

We have already seen Sir John Macdonald's opinion of the constitution of the Canadian Senate, which is largely the work of his own hands. It is true, that at an early period of his career he favoured an elective Upper House, but eight years' experience of this system was sufficient to change his views, and to convert him into a firm upholder of the nominative principle. Every year since confederation strengthened the conviction of his matured judgment and showed him more and more clearly the advantage of the nominative over the elective system. To his mind, the chief among the objections to a Senate chosen by the popular vote was the ever-present danger of its members claiming the right to deal with Money Bills, and the consequent possibility of disputes with the House of Commons. The proposal that the provincial legislatures, whose members are elected for purely local purposes, should choose the senators to legislate on matters of general concern, was also objectionable, being opposed to the spirit of the constitution, which confined the local assembly to a strictly limited sphere of action. He held that the system unanimously agreed to at the Quebec Conference had worked well, and should be undisturbed.

Thus we see that Sir John Macdonald's mature judgment, after many years of experience of confederation, led him to the conclusion that the system which had been adopted at confederation, that of senators being nominated by the Crown, but so chosen as to represent both parties upon the floor of that body in proportion to their power in the country, should remain undisturbed. This is a strong argument in favour of the view which I represent. I leave to the judgment of any man in this House or out of it to say whether any other rule could be wisely followed. There is a reason why the two parties should be represented in the Senate, but what reason could be given why the Senate should be filled with representatives of only one party? So long as we have party government it is surely well that both parties should be represented not only in this House but in both Houses of the legislature. No reason could be given why there should be a departure from the view which was laid down at confederation except party exigencies, except that it was found necessary to make the Senate, for a long time, a refuge for defeated politicians. Therefore, I all the

Mr. LAURIER.

more adhere—fortified as I am with the opinion of Sir John Macdonald—to the opinion that the true construction of the nominative principle is that both parties which divide public opinion in this country should be represented in that House in a manner somewhat approximating their relative strength in the country.

With regard to the motion made by my hon. friend, I have no objection to offer to it. I think it is a fair motion, and the papers will be brought down accordingly. I think I understood pretty well the first of the hon. gentleman's argument in so far as this motion applied. He stated that after the defeat of his Government he had made a certain number of appointments—

Sir CHARLES TUPPER. Recommendations.

The PRIME MINISTER. Recommendations—certain of which were approved by His Excellency and others disapproved. It is no use going again into the discussion of the question—no good purpose could be served. But I would recall the statement made by His Excellency at the time giving the reason for disregarding certain recommendations made by his advisers after their defeat. His reason was that he was bound to accept their advice on matters of routine, but all other matters that departed from routine business, he thought had better be left to the incoming Administration. I had occasion afterwards to state that we accepted the statement of His Excellency which we thought laid down a fair and equitable rule. So far as concerns the recommendations made by the hon. gentleman which were approved by His Excellency, I stated on the floor of the House that it would be the duty of the Administration to respect all these appointments unless there was some cause to the contrary. We have gone upon this rule. We have respected, or intended to respect all the recommendations approved by His Excellency, except in a few cases, where we thought there was cause for removal or for different advice being given to His Excellency. The hon. gentleman says that in some cases parties have not been notified of their appointments, and, in others, did not receive their commissions. That may be in a few cases. There may be a few cases, I know there were, where the parties did not receive their commissions, though they came within that rule; but the reason was that behind every one of those cases, as the papers will show when they are brought down, there were good reasons why the appointments should not be made. They required some inquiry, and no decision was come to at the time. We would not, and we could not, in fact, in consistency with the rules which we laid down for our guidance, dismiss anybody appointed under such circumstances, any more than we would have dismissed anybody else who had