

Nations in the thirties, in connection with the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, that unless there is strong and general agreement to see sanctions through to the end, even if that end might be military action, and if there is not the necessary willingness to take national action to enforce sanctions, then it is idle, even worse than idle, to consider applying them.

Our position when the sanctions resolution was tabled at the United Nations Assembly was that we were opposed to sanctions as being unjustified, as impracticable, as unlikely to accomplish the purposes which they had in mind, and as a recognition of the failure of negotiations which we thought were premature.

And so we -- our Delegation -- put forward our own proposals on February 26 -- certain positive proposals which we thought would accomplish the purpose we had in mind. I will come back to them later; what I am trying to give now is the chronological story of what happened in New York.

After this sanctions resolution was tabled, with no agreement on a resolution of the kind I have indicated with regard to arrangements to follow withdrawal, the matter was moved to Washington for discussions through diplomatic channels between representatives of Israel, the United States and France. As a result of those discussions, Israel was persuaded to withdraw her forces both civil and military from Sharm al-Shaikh and the Gaza area -- not on assurances contained in any Assembly resolution, except that of February 2, but on certain assumptions and expectations which the Government of Israel made at that time and which were announced to the General Assembly.

#### Israel's "Assumptions and Expectations"

What were these? They are very important in attempting to understand what is going on there now. They were put to the Assembly in a statement by the Foreign Minister of Israel on March 1 -- these assumptions and expectations. One was that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran would be considered as international waters, and that there would be free and innocent passage for all shipping through them, and that the United States Government would support this proposition. Second, that the United Nations Emergency Force would move into the Sharm al-Shaikh area and not be moved out of that area until the matter had been considered by the Assembly Advisory Committee of seven. Then in respect of Gaza which was the danger point at the moment, Mrs. Meir laid down these assumptions:

- (a) That on its withdrawal the United Nations forces will be deployed --

That is the withdrawal of the Israeli force.