

Supporting statements by the United States and French Representatives emphasized that this proposal was intended to deal with only one part of a comprehensive disarmament programme. The Soviet Representative, after giving an initially cautious reception to the proposal, has since returned to the sort of purely negative criticism to which he has subjected every Western suggestion so far made in the Commission. Fundamentally, his position has been that any discussion on reduction of armed forces should be on the basis of the Soviet proposals. He has claimed that the fixing of numerical ceilings on armed forces is not a reduction but only "legalization of the inflated armed forces of the Western powers", that sea and air forces should be explicitly mentioned (this in spite of the fact that the proposal refers to "all armed forces"), that the proportions between the three services be fixed and that the proposal should provide also for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, on which decisions should be taken simultaneously.

The Canadian position is that, in spite of the disappointing lack of progress so far made on the problem of disarmament, the Western powers must make every effort not only to secure effective international control of weapons of mass destruction and a balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces but also to convince both the Soviet Union and public opinion in general that this is their earnest aim. It is recognized that any real progress toward the goal of disarmament can be measured only by the extent to which agreement can be achieved between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. It is therefore Canada's main objective to bring about such agreement by any means which will at the same time safeguard national and collective security. To do this, there must be a balance of risks and safeguards on both sides and it therefore follows that no general plan of disarmament is likely to have any prospect to success unless it not only deals at the same time with both conventional and atomic armaments but also incorporates all three segments of the problem: a decision to prohibit atomic weapons and reduce armed forces and armaments; safeguards of disclosure and verification of information on such weapons, armed forces and armaments; and a system of international control to enforce the plan. In line with this approach, it has been the hope of the Canadian Government that the Disarmament Commission could be made into a working body rather than a forum. It is believed that the Commission can do constructive work if it concentrates on its terms of reference but that the quickest way to thwart that purpose is to indulge in mere propaganda. It might therefore be preferable if the Commission could restrict its public sessions as much as possible and do its work in closed committee. While international covenants should be made public, they may often be better negotiated in confidence, provided the principles and purpose of the negotiations have been made clearly known.

The Disarmament Commission, composed of representatives of members of the Security Council and Canada, which was established by the General Assembly on January 11, 1953, was instructed to submit proposals to be incorporated in a draft treaty on disarmament for submission to a world disarmament conference.

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The Commission's second report was submitted on October 3, 1952. Discussions having failed to end the deadlock previously existing in both the Atomic Energy and Functional Armaments Commissions, the report contained neither recommendations nor conclusions. The Soviet Representative had continued