

initial effort should prove valuable to those interested in understanding the confidence building phenomenon.

Historical and Contemporary Non-CSCE/OSCE Cases

The first approach employed in *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* identified historical and contemporary non-CSCE/OSCE international agreements that appeared to contain measures performing basic confidence building functions. Looking at these arrangements, it seemed at the time, might provide some additional insight into the basic nature of the confidence building phenomenon; insight not dependent upon the singular and potentially idiosyncratic CSCE/OSCE example.

The broad assumption underlying this effort was that "confidence building" might be a relatively widely occurring phenomenon (perhaps identified by other terms) but one not so readily recognized for what it was. Thus, each historical and contemporary example might provide a slightly different perspective on the phenomenon. Collectively, they might provide a richer, more comprehensive understanding of confidence building.

Although it was a good idea and probably deserves another try, the examination of possible historical and contemporary non-CSCE/OSCE cases of confidence building was not particularly rewarding. First of all, the depth of analysis was not as serious as it might have been, tending toward a superficial list of candidate agreements that "looked promising" as examples of confidence building.

Second, the attempt also was undermined by an unsophisticated sense of what should or could count as a potential example of confidence building. It is probably the case that a serious, historically-oriented review of international agreements can only occur *after* a clear and comprehensive understanding of confidence building has been developed. Although it might be useful, in principle, to reflect on historical cases in order to

develop a general explanation of confidence building, some sense of confusion about criteria — i.e., which agreements should count as examples of confidence building — is inevitable and (at best) unconstructive. After all, we are trying to use historical examples to build a general definition of confidence building but first need a usefully general definition in order to decide which examples should count as illustrations of confidence building.

Because of its almost inevitable dependence on an inherently conservative initial working definition of confidence building, an examination of historical cases of the sort undertaken in the original study is prone to reduce rather than expand the boundaries of our confidence building ideas. Thus, the use of historical cases selected according to the criteria derived from an unreflective working definition is more likely to reinforce rather than counter any basic conservative bias in efforts to understand confidence building.

A third major weakness undermining the historical perspective was the failure to distinguish adequately between genuinely *cooperative* agreements consciously undertaken and those that were *imposed* in some manner — a crucial distinction in understanding confidence building. It is difficult to envisage an imposed confidence building agreement where a lesser or defeated power has no reasonable option but to comply. It may well be a contradiction in terms and is seen to be so from the perspective of the contemporary transformation view.

This original imprecision suggests the need to think carefully about the status of any international arrangements that involve the imposition of CBM-like measures. The current United Nations-mandated regime developed to contain Iraqi arms programmes employs transparency measures similar in content to standard CBMs. However, this does not make the regime an example of meaningful confidence building. Another example is perhaps the Bosnia CSBM Agreement flowing from the Dayton General Framework Agreement. Its measures may be identical in content to those of