governments of other countries, if there were a parallelism in their powers and authority. Membership in international organizations would be a function, not of "nation-state" status, but of the focus of the organization and the powers enjoyed by a particular level of authority. An Arctic Council, for example, might see Canadian territories (North-West Territories, Yukon) alongside an American state (Alaska), at the same table as nation-states (USSR, etc.) and Greenland (however defined).

Our concept of recognition, to the extent that we needed one, would thus be substantially different. It would be a doctrine in which we did not recognize states or governments per se, but in which we recognized the authority of governments to act as international entities (having legal personalities) in areas where their authority could be demonstrated, either through constitutional or delegated authority. This would make the recognition issue one of clarifying authority rather than one of choosing between competing levels of authority. In fact, it might well have some roots in the traditional concept of recognition as drawn from the Estrada doctrine.

## VI. Conclusion:

In the end, we may need to de-emphasize the notion of "recognition" to the point where it gradually disappears as a doctrine in international law and practice. We may need to revert instead to the issues of:

- respect for principles we value (democracy, respect for human rights), thus loading our political vernacular with a philosophical commitment to responsiveness and an acceptance that institutional sovereignty must be derived at root from the fundamental freedom of the individual; and
- clarity in the division of powers permitting entities with international responsibilities to participate effectively in the international arena, taking fully into account the complexities inherent in "non-parallel" patterns of power distribution from state to state.

The dominant mood is pragmatism. The political principle is functionalism. In the spirit of Woody Allen, although perhaps not exactly in his words, "We can recognize anyone who owes us money."

