

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

be feasible. On the other hand, we cannot deny the council the right to state that a violation has taken place if this has been substantiated by the inspection.

Article X, on assistance, has been thoroughly debated, especially during the summer session. The result, however, is disappointing. The text that now appears in appendix II is heavily bracketed and contains clearly contradictory elements. It seems necessary to reconsider the whole article. The main assurance against the use of chemical weapons lies in a convention of comprehensive scope, effectively verified and universally adhered to. This is the convention we are elaborating. If we conclude such a convention, the issues addressed in article X acquire a rather academic and theoretical character. Nevertheless, such a provision serves a purpose during the transitional period, and can therefore be viewed as yet another way of tackling the issue of undiminished security. But to serve a purpose it must be realistic in scope and possible to implement. Basically it must contain provisions for assistance in cases of chemical weapons use. Such provisions ought to be easy to elaborate. We have, regrettably, growing experience of extending such assistance to victims of chemical warfare. Furthermore, it can contain provisions for facilitating co-operation in the development by member States of programmes in the field of protection against chemical weapons use. Such co-operation must, however, be carried out on a voluntary basis. For many non-possessors of chemical weapons, undiminished security during the transitional period depends on a high degree of confidentiality regarding their own national programmes and equipment for protection against the use of chemical weapons. That national security interest is incompatible with the concept of model agreements.

I have already at the outset mentioned our progress regarding article XI. Suffice it to repeat briefly that in the view of my delegation the remaining brackets could be removed and the text transferred to appendix I.

As far as the final clauses are concerned, article XII has become a stumbling-block. For Sweden, as for many other delegations, our whole work would be undone if unilaterally declared "rights" under the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were to be transferred and thereby somehow eternalized in a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This convention, as of its entry into force, unambiguously rules out the use of chemical weapons, and that means any use of chemical weapons. This does not mean that those "rights" fully cease. They will have a residual character, but only as a result of withdrawal from the convention. To solve the issue the proposal put forward by Canada that article XII should simply be deleted merits full consideration. It goes without saying that the convention would not limit the obligations under the Geneva Protocol.

The Swedish view on the issue of use leads us to the conclusion that States parties, in exercising their national sovereignty, will have the right to withdraw from the convention if extraordinary events related to the subject-matter of the convention have jeopardized their supreme interests. This right should only take effect if scope for remedying the situation under the convention has been exhausted.