

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

the chemical industry for peaceful purposes. Conversely, a less strict verification régime would detract from confidence in the convention and would create a lack of security at the international level. Consequently the aspect of security and the aspect of the peaceful uses of chemicals should be properly balanced in the convention. The way in which this question is resolved will determine whether the objective sought through the convention will be successfully attained. When these two aspects are raised, it is the ultimate objective that should guide the negotiations.

This criterion should be reflected, in the first place, in the definition of chemical weapons. We are all aware that article II of the convention is crucial to its effectiveness. The present wording was provisionally adopted in 1984, and should be studied at an appropriate time in the light of progress in our work and the clearer picture we now have of the convention. Progress in the negotiations has also highlighted the need for the toxicity criterion to be determined in a precise and practical manner, and that the concepts used should be uniform throughout the text of the convention.

The establishment of an order of destruction is another of the major tasks before the Ad hoc Committee. Just as the existence of chemicals that pose a greater risk for the convention is recognized, it should also be recognized that there are chemical weapons that are more dangerous than others and, consequently, they should be destroyed first, otherwise we would be jeopardizing the principle of promoting confidence at the start of the destruction phase.

The principle of not undermining the security of any State during the chemical weapon destruction phase is of fundamental importance. The disparity between chemical-weapon and non-chemical-weapon States will be maintained during the period of destruction of stockpiles and even subsequently should there be chemical-weapon States that are not parties to the convention. Consequently, one cannot rule out the threatened or potential use of chemical weapons. To make up for that disparity and make the principle a reality, States parties, particularly those that do not possess chemical weapons, should be assured of the possibility of some capacity to defend themselves against chemical warfare. Bearing in mind that what is involved is defence against a weapon of mass destruction, protection measures should guarantee the safety not only of the military but also, and particularly, of the civilian population.

With respect to the non-production of chemical weapons, monitoring should in no way detract from the inalienable right of all States parties to the convention to research, develop, produce, acquire, transfer and use all chemical substances for peaceful purposes, with the only quantitative restriction applying to a certain limited quantity of super-toxic lethal chemicals per year for non-prohibited purposes. Similarly, the provisions of the treaty should not be interpreted or implemented in a discriminatory fashion, as this would affect countries' economic, social, scientific and technological development. Agreement by States parties to the convention to renounce possession of chemical weapons, particularly States that do not possess them, should provide a guarantee of access to the exchange of all chemical substances, equipment and scientific and technological information and international co-operation for peaceful purposes. Just as the undertaking