

*External Affairs*

meeting in San Francisco of the United Nations. This afternoon I am going to deal with Canada's position under three heads. First, her position in the United Nations; second, her position in the commonwealth, to which I hope the Prime Minister will give his attention, and place before parliament a picture that is not as ambiguous and hazy as the one he presented a few weeks ago; and, finally, our position with relation to the United States of America in the co-operation which must, by reason of our geographical position, be maintained between us.

I ask the minister this: What is being done on the part of Canada to make a contribution to suggestions about alterations in the charter? I realize the difficulty. I realize the possibly insurmountable difficulties. Over the years it has been subjected to some 61 vetoes, a course of action that was never expected at San Francisco. There is the contention by the minister and also by the Prime Minister, when he returned from the old country, that possibly some of these matters might well be solved by secret diplomacy, by meetings outside the United Nations and by considerations beyond the United Nations, rather than through the instrumentality of the body that was set up for the purpose of making settlements of these matters.

Today there are many critics who say that the United Nations has become a debating society. I am not in agreement with them. But I do believe this, that on every occasion that secret diplomacy is resorted to, the authority and prestige of the United Nations is correspondingly reduced. I think Canada has followed a course that deserves commendation in one particular. Other countries more and more are by-passing the United Nations, in sending to that body representatives with other than cabinet rank. Canada has continued to be represented by two members of the government of this country. I believe that has been a course worthy of the aspirations of the United Nations and one that might well be emulated by those other countries that are members of that organization.

However, as I listened today as the minister outlined the question of Formosa, I could not but think that a considerable change has come over him since he delivered his speech the other day extra-murally in the city of Toronto. There has been a change in external affairs, particularly in Canada's position internationally, arising from the Formosa situation and also in consequence of our geographical position.

Mr. Dulles upon his return to Washington indicated there that the situation was serious

in the Far East. The minister today used the expression "explosive". When Mr. Dulles came back from Asia he said he came back with foreboding which was analogous to that of an irresistible force about to meet an immovable object. He was asked to speculate on the question as to whether or not, with the uncertainties of the Chinese mind, war might result from the stand being taken regarding Formosa and the two islands of Quemoy and Matsu. He said, narratively, that collision might take place next week, next year, or perhaps never.

The minister says he is not in agreement with the stand being taken by the United States. That stand is a unilateral one so far as the United States is concerned. It has assumed responsibilities that, for generations, were discharged by the British. Today in Asia, by reason of its assumption of world power, it finds itself making decisions which are fearful in their import and dangerous in their possible consequences.

The minister pointed out the wording of Mr. Dulles' statement of the United States position, that an attack on Quemoy and Matsu as such—and he emphasized those two words—would not necessarily bring the United States into active conflict with the Chinese communists. In other words the position appears to be somewhat ambiguous. If in attacking those two islands the communists intend to use them as bases for an attack on Formosa, then as such they have conducted that provocation which inevitably, if United States policy is carried out, will lead to resistance by the United States. Indeed the power given to the President is such that he may proceed only if the conclusion to which he comes is that the steps being taken against those islands would indeed be steps indicative of an intention to proceed.

The United States sees that China is mobilizing industrially and agriculturally in a plan for the future, as no other nation in the world is mobilizing today. Communist China has tasted what the communists believe to have been a victory in Korea. The recital by the minister as to the situation in Korea might give colour to their belief. They believe that they are impregnable and irresistible. They take the view that the United States is irresolute because it did not stand at the Yalu river in 1950. They contend, in a propaganda way, that the United States welshed in Indo-China in 1954, and that the request to the Chiang Kai-shek government to relinquish the Tachen islands was indicative of irresolution and fear.