

<i>Collateral Analysis</i>	In the Cold War, with the asymmetry in the availability of open literature information between East and West, this was not a very reliable method of verification. But in the post-Cold War era with so much information publicly available, much of it produced by governments themselves, and globalization of the media, verifying some elements of the RMA could be easier, for example, military organization and doctrine. Moreover, once developed, the capabilities of weapons systems may become known, especially if they are employed.
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Systems

<i>Photo Reconnaissance/ Satellite</i>	Useful for observing some weapons developments, but limited in terms of providing for surveillance of technological changes based upon advanced computer techniques. Moreover, only some states would be able to employ these systems.
<i>Radiation Detectors/ Seismic Sensors/ Remote Sensing posts</i>	Not applicable.
<i>Literature survey/ Exchange of information</i>	Useful tools for collateral analysis as method of keeping track of RMA developments.

Level of Verification

<i>Absolute Verification</i>	Nearly impossible given the nature of the weapons and the technologies which make observation and counting difficult.
<i>Adequate Verification</i>	If the NPT is held up as a regime with "adequate verification", efforts to control the RMA could not even reach this level.