prevention and crisis management," and the development of "practical co-operation activities."[35] The Concept also suggests that "arms control, disarmament, and proliferation" and the promotion of CSBMs in these spheres are key roles of the Alliance. This includes discussion of arms transfers and export controls.[36] Many of these (e.g. arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation, confidence building and conflict prevention, and the issue of democratic control of the armed forces) are all also key elements of the FSC mandate. The potential for duplication is obvious. Indeed, one might argue that the creation of the EAPC itself is duplicative, since its mandate so closely parallels the mandated activities of the FSC. There is reason to believe that the FSC may be intrinsically more promising as a mechanism to engage these issues, since it has a broader membership and is not associated with Cold War Alliance structures. The expansion of EAPC to its current membership of 45 goes some distance towards reducing the universality advantage. However, NATO structures clearly differentiate between NATO member and non-member states. Moreover, with regard to the second point, although Russia has returned to active participation in NATO structures, it is nonetheless clear that Russia views NATO to lack legitimacy as a pan-European security structure. This is unlikely to change. For these reasons, it would seem appropriate to consider situating the discussion of pan-regional security issues as listed above in the OSCE/FSC context, rather than in NATO.

That said, the EAPC and NATO more generally have been careful about treading too heavily into issue areas where the OSCE/FSC have taken a leading role, although a number of EAPC members see it as the best, if not the only, way to engage certain countries in dialogue on security issues. This caution reflects several factors. In the first place, within the EAPC there are several countries (e.g. Norway, Sweden and Finland) who use no-duplication arguments to put the UN and the OSCE forward in discussion of and decision on broader security questions. This is perhaps most obvious with regard to non-proliferation. Despite the Concept, the EAPC appears to have clearly identified this as an activity where the OSCE is taking the lead. Whether the OSCE can do so effectively, however, is debatable for reasons considered above.

The third - and most ambiguous - organizational development has been the growing role taken by the EU in foreign policy (CFSP) and security (ESDI) questions. Early in the 1990s, the EU entered the ranks of institutions seeking to mediate conflicts in its ill-starred effort to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. Part of the effort involved the deployment of monitors. Undeterred by the abject failure of these efforts, from the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 forward, the EU has also come to embrace the maintenance of international peace and the strengthening of international security as key elements of its emerging foreign policy programme. This came to involve a direct organizational role in aspects of the Yugoslav crisis prior to Dayton (viz. EU administration of Mostar). The EU also

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[35] NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," (Washington, April 1999), paragraphs 10, 31, 34, 40. Http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.

[36] One justification encountered for EAPC discussion of export controls is that it is the only way to engage partners who are not members of the Wassenaar group in dialogue on this important proliferation issue. This ignores the clear mandate of the FSC with regard to dialogue with member states on arms transfers and proliferation and probably reflects scepticism regarding the effectiveness of the OSCE as an institutional mechanism for dealing with this cluster of problems.