

an assessment. Deals previously unknown to public specialists and NGOs were revealed by the Register and the Register confirmed actual numbers of systems and their year of delivery far beyond what was publicly known. In sum, the fact that most of the actual arms trade was made transparent takes this mode of commerce out of the unknown and into the domain of the United Nations where it can be acted on in public. On the other hand, the lack of transparency in some transfers, especially missiles and missile launchers, detract from the overall goal of openness.

*Confidence Building.* The fact that 83 states participated in a very new and historic exercise creates an environment of confidence where none existed before on a global scale. The first year demonstrated that states can and will submit transparent military data with little negative effect, either nationally, regionally or universally. The development of a public database of government produced arms trade statistics should give states confidence to continue to submit data and improve the process. One must await the further development of the Register to see the extent of the positive effect of such submission in regard to confidence building. Detracting from this goal of confidence building was the low level of participation in certain regions and the poor quality of data in the missile and missile launcher category.

*Universal participation.* The Register was developed as a universal and non-discriminatory process, global in scope. Most of the key states in the arms trade did participate. And there is some evidence that there was a chain reaction of sorts, that states became aware of each others reporting activities and did not want to be seen as being left out of this evolving global process. Regional promotion occurred, both as a result of extant regional organizations (e.g., CSCE, EU) and the regional workshops conducted by the UN Office (now Centre) of Disarmament Affairs. Detracting from the achievement of this goal, of course, was the fact that 55% of the member states of the UN did *not* participate. In the case of the Register, participation reinforces the new norms contained in the Register and equates directly with the achievement of this goal.

*Prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons.* As has previously been stated, this is a Register process designed to prevent a re-run of the 1990 Iraq situation, by preventing the excessive and destabilizing accumulation (i.e., build-ups) of conventional weapons. It must be concluded that during the first year of operation of the Register little progress was made toward achieving this goal, for four basic and understandable reasons. First, the Register as currently constructed contains only data on transfers. An adequate assessment of the destabilizing nature of a military build-up requires a baseline (military holdings) and the acquisitions (imports plus procurement through national production) of each party during the year in question. Secondly, it is highly unlikely that in the case of conventional weapons that one year, particularly 1992 when global arms deliveries were lower than normal, would produce a conclusion of 'excessive and destabilizing.'