

they can, if properly utilized, enhance the benefits from each process individually, and all three processes collectively.

- The synergistic relationships among these three processes can further contribute to international security, through both improved effectiveness and better use of limited resources.

Arms Control Verification

- An arms control verification regime consists of the totality of measures, procedures and methods for acquiring the information necessary to assure compliance, deter non-compliance and/or resolve ambiguous events on the part of the parties to an arms control agreement.
- *Effective* verification will continue to be the standard by which verification regimes will be judged. However, determining what constitutes effective verification in the new, unstable multilateral and regional environment will be very difficult and controversial.
- The criterion for determining effective verification will continue to be *military significance*. However, what constitutes military significance in a multilateral or regional context is quite different from that in the old bilateral world. Each party to a multilateral or regional agreement will have its own view of what constitutes military significance and thus effective verification.
- When assessing the effectiveness of a verification regime, the synergistic effects between elements of the negotiated regime and outside elements should be taken into account. Particularly important outside elements are the utilization of CBMs and information resulting from peace operations.
- Designing a verification regime requires a number of steps. The nature and scope of the information required to assure effective verification should be determined first. Next, there should be an assessment of whether the needed information is and will continue to

be available in a reliable and usable manner from existing sources. Lastly, the *provisions* of the verification regime should be formulated to assure the availability of accurate, timely data necessary for determining compliance. The transparency and information resulting from CBMs and data available from national intelligence means (NIM) should be fully explored in the second step.

- In formulating and negotiating future verification regimes, consideration should be given to including specific provisions or possible actions to be taken in the event of non-compliance. Including such provisions could further deter cheating, provide a basis for action by other parties, and partially answer the to-date-unanswered question, "after non-compliance, what?"

Confidence-Building Measures

- Confidence-building measures are primarily directed toward the establishment of confidence in the benign *intentions*, rather than the military capabilities of states. In many cases, it will be more difficult to obtain convincing evidence of non-compliance with CBMs than with treaties to limit arms.
- Future CBMs should offer the potential for making a significant contribution to effective verification.
- Unless and until there is an agreed formal and effective verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), confidence-building measures provide the best means of enhancing confidence in compliance of all the parties.
- Although the Open Skies concept is considered to be a confidence-building rather than a verification measure, it can contribute significantly to the monitoring of regional non-proliferation and demilitarization agreements and peace operations.
- Measures to reduce motivation for an arms race in space may take the form of CBMs rather than formal treaties.

