am reviewing it, or that we will lessen it. When I referred to Canada and the NPT, obviously until China signs the NPT specifically for CANDU reactors or any other nuclear technology Canada could not co-operate.⁸

In a supplementary question, Ms. Copps asked:

[w]ill the Minister not categorically reject any review of Canada's participation in the NPT? Does he not understand that the sale of nuclear reactors should...depend on the economic and political stability of the countries involved? How could he make a statement like this?

Obviously in view of what has happened in China, before there would be any decision taken on the AECL or CANDU reactor whether it is the present situation or China's adherence to the NPT, I raised the NPT for exactly that reason. Until the Chinese will conform to the NPT, obviously, Canada with its policy would not be able, and should not be able, to sell AECL or nuclear technology.... In terms of review, I said it is with respect to the manner in which AECL functions, not review of the NPT, Canada's adherence to the NPT, or that Canada will force anyone who buys nuclear technology from Canada to conform to the NPT.

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⁸ Ibid..

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid...