would be privileged if none but guardians were present, the occasion was none the less privileged because reporters for the press happened to be present at the meeting, it being the established practice of the board to admit the public to their meetings.

HUSBAND AND WIFE—SEPARATE ESTATE—DEATH OF WIFE—DEVOLUTION TO HUSBAND JURE MARITI—DEBTS OF WIFE—MARRIED WOMAN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1882 (45 & 46 VICT., C. 75), S.1, S-S. 3, S. 23—(R.S.O., C. 132, S. 3, S-S. 3, S. 22).

In *Surman* v. *Wharton* (1891), 1 Q.B. 491, a married woman being entitled to separate estate, consisting of leasehold property, after the commencement of the M.W.P. Act, 1882, borrowed money from the plaintiff. She died intestate, and her husband, without taking out administration, entered into possession of the leasehold property. This action was brought by the plaintiff against the husband to recover the money lent to the wife. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the leasehold vested in the husband *jure mariti*, without administration, free from liability for her debts; and if it did not so vest, he was wrongly sued, as he was not the legal personal representative of the wife, within the meaning of s. 23 (see R.S.O., c. 132, s. 22). Pollock, B., and Charles, J., although agreeing that the Married Woman's Property Act, 1882, did not alter the course of devolution, and that on the wife's death intestate her separate property passed to her husband *jure mariti* without administration, were nevertheless of the opinion that the husband so taking was her "legal personal representative" within the meaning of s. 23, and therefore that he was liable for the debt sued on to the extent of the separate property of his wife come to his hands. We may observe that there is a very important difference created between the English and Ontario Act by s. 23 of the latter Act, which in effect provides that where a married woman dies intestate, leaving a husband and children, her separate property is not to devolve on her husband alone, but is to be distributed between the husband and children in the same proportions as the personal property of a husband dying intestate is distributed between his wife and children. Whenever, therefore, this provision takes effect, it would seem that the husband would not, on his wife's death, take her separate property *jure mariti*, but administration would be necessary; and this fact it is necessary to bear in mind when considering the application of this case in reference to the Ontario Act. When the wife leaves no children, the husband in Ontario would appear to be entitled *jure mariti*, as in England.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—CAUSE OF ACTION, ACCRUAL OF—CONTINUOUS DAMAGE—SUBSIDENCE OF LAND.

In *Crumbie* v. *Wallsend Local Board* (1891), 1 Q.B. 503, the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M.R., and Bowen and Fry, L.JJ.) were called on to apply the rule established by the House of Lords in *Darley Main Colliery Co.* v. *Mitchell*, 11 App. Cas. 127, regarding the application of Statutes of Limitations to cases of damage arising from subsidence of land. In this case an excavation had been made under a street by the authority of the defendants, a municipal body, for the purpose of laying a sewer; the excavation had not been properly filled in, and in