

The outcome is great difficulty in finding a coherent policy thread through these related issues, although the level of very moral Canadian statements over the years has been high and the statements at times have verged on self-righteousness.

Where the prospect of profits is not encouraging, the first of these national positions can be applied in extreme ways. The most immediate example involves southern Africa. If, as seems to be the case, the policies of the Rhodesian regime of Prime Minister Ian Smith have changed in favour of some moderation, this is clearly a response to the threat confronting that country from the armed attacks of black guerilla groups rather than to the diplomatic efforts of Britain and the United States. Mr. Smith has withstood many diplomatic approaches over the years.

The personalities and political sympathies of some of the leaders of the guerilla forces cause reservations about them but, historically, it remains true that personal freedom and political liberty have usually been secured by fighting. Countries such as Canada and some other ex-members of the British Empire are favoured exceptions. Even there, the initial, largely peaceful devolution of power within the Empire and its ultimate disintegration without extensive British resistance have in a good many cases been followed by political instability and violence. The road to freedom is generally not smooth and history is full of examples of the rockiness of that course.

Canada applies its policy of not selling arms to areas of unrest rigidly in the case of southern Africa but offers sympathy, moral support and some non-military aid to the guerilla groups. If this were the outcome of hard analysis of the policies of southern Africa, and of specific policy decisions based on that approach, no government would find it difficult to defend the position. It seems to be, however, the application of a general policy without much reference to the specifics of the situation. Apart from whatever moral satisfaction it gives the Government of Canada, the policy has two other results.

One was evident in the autumn meeting in Ottawa of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Even moderates from the coloured members of the Commonwealth demonstrated, through their statements, their lack of confidence in the diplomatic efforts to produce a moderate Rhodesian settlement, their views that British and American policy (which Canada follows) was highly hypocritical and that the opponents of Mr. Smith should secure military aid wherever they could find it. Some of the spokesmen were very specific on this latter point, urging that there should be no hesitation in securing assistance from

the Soviet Union, the arms-producing countries of Eastern Europe and China. At present, the U.S.S.R. and China are the most important suppliers of weapons to the guerilla forces.

Policies are rarely applied in a vacuum. The two principal suppliers of arms to the black fighting forces in southern Africa are, on the basis of their past approaches alone, clearly looking to enhanced influence in the future. It is open to great doubt whether it is in the interest of any Western nation to see southern Africa come under heavy Chinese or Russian influence, if not some element of control. *Détente* has come into existence but has not progressed to the point where the extension of the Communist world is a matter of indifference.

One of the major questions to be asked, then, is simply whether we, and our important allies, will feel happy if southern Africa in the end comes substantially within the sphere of the two Communist great powers, even though they are in a state of conflict between themselves. If the answer to that question is negative, a second one follows: should foreign policy decisions be based upon a nation's long-term interest or the pursuit of a sense of moral satisfaction? There is little evidence in Canadian policies that these questions have been seriously asked or answered, even though the purport of the foreign policy review some years ago was that genuine self-interest should be the guiding principle of a nation's external policies.

On the second of the Canadian policy contradictions, part of the inevitable background is that the power of nuclear weapons is terrible, the potential danger from some nuclear wastes great. This has produced certain inevitable reactions that are commonplace in the world. But these tend to obscure two historical realities and a third current one. History has shown us that atomic arsenals are of practical military value only during a period - in fact, very brief - of monopoly. The American arsenal, in the development of which Canada played an early role, was used during that brief period. Since then, no direct military use has ever been made of the huge supply of nuclear weapons that exists in today's world. The greatest single effort has been to maintain a balance between the two biggest arsenals with the mutual aim of keeping them neutralized. Some of the smaller arsenals have been developed either because individual countries, such as France under General de Gaulle, felt that they could not rely upon an offered nuclear umbrella, or because no real umbrella was available, which was China's case. Some steps towards nuclear self-reliance have been taken for complex reasons of na-

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