

Pearson rejected the idea of isolationism that had haunted him from the days of his former chief and predecessor, Mackenzie King. As he writes: "Since Canada could not escape the effects of international storms by burying her head in the sand, she should play a part in trying to prevent the storms by accepting international commitments for that purpose."

He likewise rejected "activism" for its own sake, and frankly admitted that the responsibilities assumed by Canada in the postwar era were temporary. "The war," he writes, "had weakened many other countries, and destroyed some, and had left Canada economically strong and physically intact. It was this temporary situation, and our utilization of it, that made our international policies and actions more forthright than they would otherwise have been."

Warning about role

Replying with equal frankness to the implied criticism in *Foreign Policy for Canadians* of Canada's being cast in the role of "helpful fixer", Mr. Pearson writes: "I have many times pointed out that we can exaggerate our influence and over-play our participation in international affairs." In fact, as he says, he regarded a broad and active internationalism as very much consistent with the Canadian interest of preserving our sovereignty by establishing a balance between "a too exclusively continental relationship" and our "wider British Commonwealth, French and other international connections".

The essentials of Mr. Pearson's philosophical framework of internationalism are best expressed in these words, which bear repeating: "I am certain that, for Canada, isolation can never be a principle of policy, any more than can imperialist expansion. Everything that happens in the world affects us, and to a degree greater than most countries. Consequently, it is always foolish to assume that we can safely leave global matters of war and peace to the Great Powers, while we modestly concentrate our energies on protecting our sovereignty and increasing our gross national product."

"Participatory internationalism" for Mr. Pearson meant not shirking a responsibility, when sought — but not looking for a job as "helpful fixer". I remember, in the middle of the Suez crisis, answering endless telephone calls at his suite in the Drake Hotel, New York, which came pouring in from Cairo, New Delhi, London and Washington, as Mr. Pearson worked away with patience to establish UNEF, in the very eye of the Suez storm.

He did not seek election to the Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations or of NATO, or the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly, or to be one of the "Three Wise Men" to help rescue NATO from the disarray within the alliance after Suez. As Hume Wrong, probably his closest confidant, once said to me: "Mike is like a Houdini — put him in the middle of a crisis and he will get himself out of the mess, and in the process will help others to get out of it as well."

Taking risks

This quality of intuitive judgment, coupled with an idealistic willingness to take risks for peace, while never succumbing to the "cult of personality", made him a natural healer to turn to in time of trouble. His warm and friendly personality became recognized as the personification of all that was best in the Canadian character and, as the Cold War cut a chasm among the nations, bringing in its wake a drift to regionalism instead of the hoped-for universalism, he more than anyone helped to keep the Cold War cold.

"For many are called, but few are chosen" — in international affairs, as in other branches of human affairs. Mr. Pearson was chosen over others, primarily because he really cared, and showed it by a demonstrated willingness to throw himself unreservedly into whatever he undertook to do. I was first impressed by his unusual capacity for concentrated effort when we worked together at Canada House during the war. He would start with his "in-tray" piled high with files early in the morning, and by noon it would be empty. And "paper-pushing" was no measure of the extent of his already substantial influence on wartime London.

This capacity to care, as well as his foresight, emerge from his memoirs, as does the quality of his diplomatic craftsmanship, and the hard work he put into the discharge of his responsibilities, as President of the General Assembly, for instance, when he was trying to prevent the Cold War confrontation dividing the superpowers in Europe, from being extended to involve China over the Korean crisis. The handling by the United States of China's intervention in Korea after General MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel and was urging the bombing of Manchuria produced what Mr. Pearson called "one of the most serious divisions we have had with the United States on policy." The story is recorded by Mr. Pearson in detail in the appendices. The differences which also developed over the question of the condemnation of China, while trying

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