1885; Hansard's Debates, Vols. 293-301, London, 1884-5; High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Chicago, 1884; Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 29, Edinburgh, 1885; Jackson's "Century of Dishonour," Boston, 1886; Kansas Reports, Vols. 1-33, Topeka; Leigh & Le Marchant on Elections, 4th edition, London, 1885; Lely & Foulke's Parliamentary Election Acts, London, 1885; Lawrence's Public International Law, Cambridge, 1885; Lewis on Shipping, Toronto, 1886; Mackenzie's Life of the Hon. Geo. Brown, Toronto, 1882; Morris' Treaties with the Indians, Toronto; Mew's Digest for 1885, London, 1886; Mair's Drama, "Tecumseh," Toronto, 1886; Murfree on Official Bonds, St. Louis, 1885; North-Eastern Reporter, Vol. 1, St. Paul, 1885; Piggott on Torts, London, 1885; Pulling's Index to London Gazette, London, 1885; Roberts & Wallace on Employers, 3rd edition, London, 1885; Reed on Statute of Frauds, 3 vols., Philadelphia, 1884; Stephen's Dictionary National Biography, Vol. 5, London, 1886; Whittaker's Almanac for 1886; Williams' Real Property, 15th edition, London, 1885; Wood on Mandamus, Albany, 1880; Wallace's "Bad Times," London, 1885.

FLOTSAM AND JETSAM.

The *San Francisco Wasp* says a jury is "a number of persons appointed by a court to assist the attorneys in preventing law from degenerating into justice"; which is lucky for the newspapers.—*Albany Law Journal.*

One of the most characteristic remarks ever heard from a Welsh witness was elicited in the course of a recent trial. The witness, after answering a question in chief, blandly inquired of the examining counsel, "Have I said right?"—*Irish Law Times.*

The Supreme Court of the United States in *Little* v. *Hackett* holds that a person who hires a public hack, and gives the driver directions as to the place to which he wishes to be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not responsible for his acts or negligence, or prevented from recovering against a railroad company for injuries suffered from a collision of its trains with the hack, caused by the negligence of both the managers of the train and of the driver.—*Albany Law Journal.*

It cannot be said that England does not pay its judicial officers well. The recent death of the second Lord Brougham, at the age of ninety-one, will relieve the Government from the payment of a pension of $3,225 a year, which was granted in 1852, on the abolition of the office of Master in Chancery, which he held. Thus in thirty-three years the Government must have paid that person about $532,000. Great reforms cost, it seems. It must have cost much more for England to get rid of that office than it cost this State to get rid of the common-law practice.—*Albany L. J.*

Insurance agents may note that it has been held in the United States in *Crandal* v. *Accident Insurance Co.* (Chicago Legal News, Ap. 10), that death by hanging, when insane is a death from bodily injury, effected through "external, accidental and violent means," within the meaning and intent of a policy of accident insurance. The policy in this case provided that the insurance should not extend to death or disability, "which may have been caused wholly or in part by bodily infirmities or disease." *Held*, that the death of the insured was not caused within the meaning of the law or the intent of the policy, by the disease of insanity, but by the act of self destruction.

Some time ago we alluded to a hard case, where a man convicted of manslaughter appealed, and obtained a new trial, and then was convicted of murder and sentenced to be hanged. It is now stated in the newspapers that he has appealed to the Federal Supreme Court. This is a good way to get his case "hung up," if he himself is not. It seems that there is an element of mitigation in his case. The killing grew out of a dispute over the spelling of the word "pedler." Inasmuch as the standard lexicographers spell it in several different ways, one might reasonably be excused for falling into a homicidal passion on the subject. We ourselves have more than once refrained from immolating a proof-reader for a like cause, only by a powerful exercise of the will, especially when he has calmly corrected a word purposely misspelled.—*Albany Law Journal.*