

(Mr. Kosin, Yugoslavia)

convention will lead to fewer suspicions, less distrust and less fear. We will be turned towards each other, rather than confronting each other. In this article the convention must reflect exactly such an approach, and we believe there is, in fact, already a broad consensus on that point.

Regarding adherence to and duration of the convention, the text must explicitly provide that they will not be limited. The question of withdrawal from membership is related to this. The final solution of this question must be viewed within the framework of the justified demands for universality, or, at least, the need for the inclusion of all countries with a technological capability to produce chemical weapons. Such an approach already contains specific limitations on withdrawal from the convention.

(Mr. Bild, Canada)

... With these reflections in mind, I turn briefly to the specific issues before us at the CD, starting with agenda item 4 - chemical weapons. Over the past two years, agreement has been reached on vitally important issues relating to verification, methods and timetables for CW destruction, and declarations in advance of a treaty. The next few steps - hammering out the details - will not by their very nature give the appearance of dramatic progress. But appearances cannot be a substitute for real, if slower and more arduous, headway in completing the draft convention before us. The key lies in keeping the negotiations free from artificial deadlines and from the inclination to force issues ahead of what consensus can sustain. Progress over the next session will be step-by-step and will depend on appropriate attention to detail. I commend the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, in facilitating this progress through his well-focused and practical work programme.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the 16 verification principles agreed by consensus at the UNDC constitute the corner-stone of an emerging common approach to disarmament. This consensus must be protected and nourished to allow its roots to sink deeply into the multilateral disarmament process. Naturally, these roots, as they develop, will become more intertwined and complex, but this is true of any firmly established system. We should not be dismayed at the prospect of complexity in verification. The question is how we can carry out practically and effectively that which has been agreed in principle and by all member States of the Conference.

In the modern age, arms control and disarmament have become, to the surprise of some, perhaps, increasingly reliant on short-notice, on-site inspection. The feature is found in the United States/Soviet Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, as well as in the multilateral Stockholm