

- (a) examination of production for the facility concerned;
- (b) visual observation at the site, both inside and outside the production facility, to detect unnecessary stockpiling facilities, munition filling facilities, over-specialized safety equipment etc.;
- (c) engineering inspections to ensure that the production line is compatible with the production of the declared substance.

Dual Purpose Chemicals

12. The previous sections have been concerned with precursors for supertoxic chemicals. Most of these precursors are not usually produced in large quantities in civil industries and are typically produced at a small number of sites. There are other chemicals, however, which do have a large civilian use and which are also important in chemical warfare. Amongst these chemicals are those which are toxic, such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, chlorine, etc., which could pose a serious threat to personnel without protection. There are also non-toxic chemicals, such as ethylene and ethylene oxide, which could be precursors for mustard.

13. Some of the suggestions made previously for the control of precursors could be applied to these bulk chemicals. However perhaps all that is practically possible is that there would be a requirement for a declaration of all facilities producing these chemicals above a pre-arranged quantity together with their civil uses. This is an area where the collection of statistics on a national basis may play an important role. More and more countries are imposing rigorous health and safety regulations on such chemicals and in many countries there are already requirements that industrial companies provide information to their governments on their use. Additionally, for safety reasons, there is an increasing tendency not to store chemicals such as Hydrogen Cyanide but to make and use them immediately. Declaration of facilities producing or storing these chemicals should present no problem.

Effect of On-Site Inspections on Civil Chemical Industry

14. As has often been pointed out in the Committee on Disarmament, it will be important in the establishment of any verification regime for a CW convention to ensure that the civil chemical industry is affected as little as possible. Consultations will therefore be necessary by individual States with their national chemical industries to ensure that the convention does not place an unnecessary burden on them. The inspections proposed in this paper would affect few facilities and are designed to cause as little disruption as possible to the chemical industry. The British Government has been consulting representatives of the British civil chemical industry about the inspection procedures above and its preliminary conclusion is that satisfactory arrangements could be made if a convention were agreed.

Conclusion

15. The above verification regime for non-production of chemical weapons, together with routine inspection of activities such as the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities, should help to create confidence in the implementation of the convention without imposing undue strain on industry, and thus serve to decrease the